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RACE, CRIME, AND
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
ERIK LUNA*
I
INTRODUCTION
Minorities are gravely over-represented in every stage of the criminal proc-
ess—from pedestrian and automobile stops, to searches and seizures, to arrests
and convictions, to incarceration and capital punishment.1  This Symposium
provides a timely survey of the issue, with a particular focus on the importance
of collecting data which addresses racial disproportionality.  No one seems to
doubt, least of all me, that gathering, analyzing, and disseminating statistical
information will play a major role in any programmatic solution to America’s
racially skewed penal complex.  But there are limits to this endeavor, since
criminal justice information does no work by itself.  While racial data can pro-
vide a snapshot of the current state of affairs, such information rarely satisfies
questions of causation, and usually only sets the scene for normative theory.
Consider the issue of black2 disproportionality, with statistical data
confirming what is already obvious to anyone who has visited an urban
courthouse or the affiliated prison.  Any number of positive hypotheses seek to
explain the overrepresentation of African Americans in the criminal process:
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1. See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies, Study Habits: Probing Modern Attempts to Assess Minority
Offender Disproportionality, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17 (Summer 2003); Bernard E. Harcourt,
From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Crimi-
nal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  99 (Summer 2003); David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Dis-
parity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71
(Summer 2003); Joseph E. Kennedy, Drug Wars in Black and White, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151
(Summer 2003); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to
Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (Summer 2003); see also RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 128–35 (1997).
2. Throughout this article, the terms “black” and “African American” will be used interchangea-
bly, though I recognize that these words are not strictly synonymous.  For instance, a recent immigrant
from an African nation may be “black,” but absent a change in citizenship, he would not be an “African
American.”  Moreover, I will use the term “minority” to refer primarily to blacks, although the term
might apply to any racial or ethnic group that has been disempowered in the process of law enforce-
ment (e.g., Hispanic Americans).  Cf. Lynette Clemetson, Hispanics Now Largest Minority, Census
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, at A1 (discussing new census figures demonstrating that Hispanics
are largest minority group in U.S.).
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the criminogenic influence of socio-economic deprivation in black
neighborhoods;3 the intense policing of open-air drug markets in predominantly
minority inner-cities;4 and even the disturbing claim that, for some reason,
African Americans simply have a unique propensity toward crime.5  Law
enforcement apologists, with a little massaging, can convert these explanatory
theories of racial disproportionality into normative justifications for the end
result.6
In black communities,7 however, the same statistics and perceived reality
breed a different hypothesis, one of malignant cause-and-effect: African Ameri-
cans are over-represented in the criminal justice system precisely because of
racial prejudice by law enforcement.  Whether this explanation is true or not is
3. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 4–5 (1999) [hereinafter COLE, NO EQUAL]; JACK KATZ,
SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 154–63 (1988); KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 23–24.  According to Elliot Currie,
“there is now overwhelming evidence that inequality, extreme poverty, and social exclusion matter pro-
foundly in shaping a society’s experience of violent crime.”  ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 114 (1998).  That experience, Currie maintains, is grounded in America’s
“new social Darwinism, the increasingly harsh attack on living standards and social supports, especially
for the poor.”  Id. at 7.
4. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 556–
57 (2000) [hereinafter Luna, Principled Enforcement]; Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 1107, 1157 (2000) [hereinafter Luna, Transparent Policing]; William J. Stuntz, O.J.  Simpson, Bill
Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 872–75 (2001); William
J.  Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1998).
5.  Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in
New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 458–59 (2000) (noting “temptation among law enforce-
ment officers to simply ‘play the base rates’ by stopping minority suspects because minorities commit
more crimes”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 783–89, 800–01, 805–10 (1999) (discussing
assumption of black criminality); John Derbyshire, In Defense of Racial Profiling: Where is Our
Common Sense?, NAT’L. REV., Feb. 19, 2001, at 38 (arguing that racial profiling is empirically justi-
fied); cf. KATZ, supra note 3, at ch. 7 (discussing meaning of criminality for minority males).
6. For instance, some advocates have supported heightened drug enforcement in minority neigh-
borhoods, greater punishment for crack versus powder cocaine, and loitering ordinances that target
minority gang members as means of protecting law-abiding minority citizens and cleaning up their
neighborhoods.  See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 301 (noting “about half” of the Congressional
Black Caucus supported tough punishment for crack cocaine); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares,
Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan &
Meares, Coming Crisis] (arguing in favor of various discretionary policing techniques such as gang-loi-
tering ordinances); Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1994) (arguing that government may be “justified in penalizing posses-
sion of crack cocaine more harshly than possession of powdered cocaine notwithstanding the racial
demographics that emerged from the operation of this sentencing scheme”).
7. Admittedly, the word “community” is a loaded term.  I have previously delineated community
“by two components: geographic compactness and socio-economic homogeneity.”  Luna, Transparent
Policing, supra note 4, at 1118 n.34.  Here, however, I will use separate terms to distinguish two distinct
but related concepts: By “community”—as in the black or African-American community—I am refer-
ring to a group of individuals defined by some shared characteristic or interest, such as race, ethnicity,
or sexual orientation, where the group recognizes this defining attribute, presents ideas and arguments
that are generally shared by individual members, and can thus nominally “speak” on behalf of these
individuals (the NAACP might be a good example).  A community may also be defined by geography,
although as used here, the term does not necessarily incorporate spatial boundaries.  When specifically
referring to a named group within a meaningful geographic border, I will use the term “neighborhood”
instead of “community.”  So, for instance, all African Americans in the greater Los Angeles metropoli-
tan area might be part of L.A.’s “black community,” but only those individuals living in a predomi-
nantly black residential area, like Watts, would be members of a “black neighborhood.”
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almost beside the point—in race relations, perceptions matter.  Although some
disparities, such as jury decision-making in capital punishment cases,8 have rela-
tively little to do with law enforcement, police officers still embody the initial
contact between African Americans and the criminal justice system.  To the
extent law enforcement is seen as an occupying force in minority
neighborhoods, with black citizens policed by white cops,9 the police will tend to
bear the brunt of local animosity that stems from racial disproportionality.
Moreover, statistics on black overrepresentation may simply corroborate
the existence of various forms of official misconduct,10 such as the unjustifiable
use of force and methodical police harassment in public places, which are
readily apparent to both victims and affected communities.  “Each negative
experience creates another building block in the Black folklore about police,”11
notes Professor Kathryn Russell.  The totality of these experiences contributes
to the shared belief that law enforcement is fundamentally unfair and preju-
diced against African Americans.  Negative confrontations become “race-
making situations,”12 constructing what it means to be black through interaction
with police—namely, second-class citizens under constant surveillance and
subject to abusive enforcement.  Given that blacks are often bound together
through “linked fate”13—an evaluation of individual welfare based on the
treatment of other African Americans and the race as a whole—the perceived
abuses form a basis for racial solidarity against law enforcement.
The perception of official misconduct that breeds African-American distrust
of law enforcement is not a figment of the black community’s collective imagi-
nation, nor is it necessarily the result of a few isolated incidents of abuse com-
8. Of course, police officers can indirectly influence jury decision-making during capital sentenc-
ing through, for instance, perjured testimony or evidence tampering.
9. KENNEDY, supra note 1 at 27; John Cloud, What’s Race Got to Do With It?, TIME, July 30,
2001, at 47.
10. The terms “misconduct,” “misbehavior,” “wrongdoing,” etc., will be used interchangeably in
this article.  They embody not only criminal behavior or violations of department regulations, but also
unethical or immoral behavior that does not necessarily violate the law.  See Michael J.  Palmiotto,
Police Misconduct: What Is It?, in POLICE MISCONDUCT: A READER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 32
(Michael J.  Palmiotto ed., 2001) [hereinafter POLICE MISCONDUCT]; MICHAEL J.  PALMIOTTO,
POLICING: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND CURRENT ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLICE FORCES 330
(1997).  These terms necessarily include police beatings (i.e., assault and battery), unjustifiable shoot-
ings (i.e., attempted or completed homicide), perjury, bribery, extortion, and other crimes.  Moreover,
they incorporate vulgar, offensive, and racist language, rude and disrespectful behavior, and race-based
decision-making, whether or not such actions constitute prosecutable offenses.  As such, police miscon-
duct (misbehavior, etc.) encompasses perceived and real violations of the public trust.  In the words of
former police chief Lee Brown, “it is critical that police . . .  judge their own behavior on the following
basis: ‘Do my actions have the appearance of impropriety’ rather than ‘have I violated the law?’”  Lee
Brown, Law Enforcement Execution on the Integrity and Ethics Challenge Facing the Profession, in
POLICE INTEGRITY 26 (Stephen J. Gaffigan & Phyllis P. McDonald eds., 1997).
11. KATHRYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK
PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 44 (1998).
12. See, e.g., David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-Making Situation: The Effects of Resi-
dential Segregation on Racial Inequalities and Racial Identity, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 407, 420–29
(1994).
13. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-
AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1994) (discussing linked fate in African-American communities).
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mitted by a handful of officers.14  Instead, police misconduct and poor minority
relations are widespread in many departments, emanating from a systemic dis-
order within the institution of law enforcement.  Indirect evidence is provided
by the verified claims of abuse by different cops, in different places, at different
times.15  Moreover, official committees organized to review beleaguered law
enforcement agencies, such as the Christopher Commission in Los Angeles and
the Mollen Commission in New York City, have found organizational cultures16
of abuse and corruption throughout those departments.17  Police officers that
live by this culture of misconduct are hard to distinguish from modern gang-
sters,18 since deviant cops, no less than urban street thugs, tend to exploit the
underclass and, in particular, racial minorities.19  Needless to say, these officers
14. David Cole, The Color of Justice: Courts are Protecting, Rather than Helping to End, Racial
Profiling by Police, THE NATION, Oct. 11, 1999, at 14 (noting that racial prejudice is “not the work of a
few ‘bad apples’ but a widespread, everyday phenomenon that will require systemic reform”);
CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & LARRY D. HAHN, POLICING IN AMERICA 254–55, 262–63 (1999) (rejecting
“rotten apple” theory); PETER NEYROUD & ALAN BECKLEY, POLICING, ETHICS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 156 (2001) (also rejecting “rotten apple” theory).
15. See, e.g., Joseph D. McNamara, When Cops Become the Gangsters, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999,
at B7 (“[T]he number and similarity of police gangster crimes nationally indicate a crisis in American
policing.”).  Law enforcement misconduct against minorities appears to be an international phenome-
non.  See, e.g., PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 145–248
(1995) (reviewing police violence in Latin America and the Caribbean); NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra
note 14, at 13 (“Allegations of police mistreatment of minority communities are virtually universal and
seem to have a set of stock characteristics.”).
16. In this context, culture encompasses the assumptions, values, and norms that help define law
enforcement and the meaning of membership, as well as the style and environment of policing.  See,
e.g., NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 78; Laurie L. Levinson, Police Corruption and New
Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002).
17. See REPORT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF
POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
(1994), reprinted in 6 NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS, 1894–
1994 (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1997); REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991) [hereinafter Christopher Commission]; see also BOARD OF INQUIRY,
L.A. POLICE DEPARTMENT RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT: PUBLIC REPORT (2000)
(report on the LAPD’s Rampart scandal), available at http://www.lapdonline.org (last visited Mar. 4,
2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, Policing the Criminal Justice System: An Independent Analysis of the Los
Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
545 (2001) (critiquing Board of Inquiry’s Rampart report).
18. See, e.g., David D. Dotson, Cross the (Blue) Line, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at M1 (describing
misbehavior of LAPD’s CRASH Unit); James Forman, Jr., Arrested Development: The Conservative
Case Against Racial Profiling, NEW REPUBLIC Sept. 10, 2001, at 24 (noting gang-like demeanor and
actions of the New York City Police Department’s Street Crimes Unit, which “adopted ‘We Own the
Night’ as its motto, and some of its officers wore t-shirts emblazoned with the Hemingway quote: cer-
tainly there is no hunting like the hunting of man, and those who have hunted men long enough and
liked it, never really care for anything else thereafter”); Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, June 20, 1999, at 57, 64 (“[Los Angeles sheriff’s] [d]eputies assigned to hard-core
gang areas often tattoo themselves identically, very much like the gangs they fight.  It is the white depu-
ties who do this, in the main, and civil rights activists have loudly accused the Sheriff’s Department of
harboring racist gangs, identifiable by the tattoos they wear.”).
19. BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 241–42; NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 79;
McNamara, supra note 15, at B7 (“Minorities tend to be the victims of the most grievous police
crimes.”)
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are supposed to protect vulnerable citizens and not victimize them—a point that
only adds insult to injury in black neighborhoods.20
The intermediate effects of this pathological environment are distrust
between police and African Americans, a belief that officers are fundamentally
unfair and prejudiced, and the perceived illegitimacy of law enforcement in
black neighborhoods.21  The ultimate consequences are many and troublesome,
including increased criminality in affected neighborhoods and citizen reluctance
to participate in the criminal process as the legitimacy of law and its enforcers
are undermined to the point of near irrelevance.22
It is against this background that data collection is offered as a possible
curative.  Information in and of itself, no matter how powerful, cannot be
expected to resolve the ill-will and intense distrust between police and black
citizens.  Data can only serve as a tool for constructing better police–community
relationships when all parties work together pursuant to a blueprint for pro-
social development.  Without mutual goals and a coordinated plan for their ful-
fillment, it should come as no surprise when law enforcement rejects empirical
data forwarded by African Americans, and vice versa.  In the racially charged,
dysfunctional conditions of many jurisdictions, law enforcement tends to view
the black community as an obstacle and ignores claims of officer misconduct,
while blacks do not trust cops, no matter what the numbers say.23
What is needed, I believe, is not reams of raw data but a response to the
broader problem—the malignant distrust between African Americans and law
enforcement, born of police misconduct and producing only more of the same.
The solution lies in a reevaluation and redesign of the institution of law
enforcement, aimed at both reducing misconduct and involving minorities in the
process of police decision-making.  By curtailing misbehavior, law enforcement
20. It should be noted, however, that African-American police officers are also susceptible to race-
based decision-making.  See, e.g., KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK 63–69 (2000) (describing
profiling incident involving black agents and quoting victim as saying: “Black men get stopped by white
officers, but black officers stop black women.”); Goldberg, supra note 18, at 55 (“‘Which are worse?’ [a
black officer] asks [a group of African Americans].  ‘White cops or black cops?’ ‘Black,’ comes the
reply, virtually in unison.”)
21. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 3, at 1–5, 10–12, 21–27, 169–79; KENNEDY, supra note 1, at x–xi
(“[N]othing has poisoned race relations more than racially discriminatory policing pursuant to which
blacks are watched, questioned, and detained more than others. . . .  [T]he race line in policing creates
cycles of resentment.”); id. at 387 (“The legal doctrines that permit police to treat blackness as a mark
of increased risk of criminality generates large pools of distrust, anger, and discord.  Blacks are keenly
aware that their constitutional protection against unwarranted police intrusion is of a decidedly inferior
sort than the protection enjoyed by whites.”); Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 556–62;
Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1107, 1117–19, 1156–58, 1191–92.
22. COLE, supra note 3, at 10–12, 169–76; KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 4, 24–27, 153; Fagan &
Davies, supra note 5, at 457–58, 499–500; Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 561; Luna,
Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1119, 1159–60, 1162–63; Goldberg, supra note 18, at 55
(describing group of blacks who continue to smoke marijuana in front of police officers, to which an
officer replies, “It’s like there aren’t any laws out here”); cf. KATZ, supra note 3, at ch. 7 (discussing
meaning of criminality for minority males).
23. See, e.g., Michael J. Sniffen, Reno Targets Police Mistrust, PITT. POST–GAZETTE, April 16,
1999, at A1 (“No matter what the data show, the perception of too many Americans is that police offi-
cers cannot be trusted.”) (quoting Attorney General Janet Reno).
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addresses the very reason for citizen distrust.  And by incorporating the black
community and affected neighborhoods into the decision-making process, law
enforcement demonstrates its charge against officer misconduct and allows
community members to participate in policy formation and review, creating a
basis for trust between government and the governed.
This is not to suggest the irrelevance of data collection to indicia of racial
profiling or other disturbing phenomena in law enforcement.  On the contrary,
as will be discussed later in this article, gathering, analyzing, and distributing
police information is part and parcel of collaborative decision-making and the
detection of officer misconduct.24  But data collection is only part of any solution
to the distrust and animosity between blacks and law enforcement.  For
instance, if empirical analysis reveals racial profiling but the relevant depart-
ment ignores it or displays indifference, data collection by itself will only tend to
increase hostility between police officers and African Americans.  The source
and rationale for gathering data also seem highly relevant.  Data collection by a
criminal defendant or civil rights plaintiff to be used in litigation against a par-
ticular department is unlikely to spur better police–citizen relations.25  In con-
trast, non-adversarial empiricism in service of collaborative decision-making
and a more trustworthy relationship can help avoid a statistical squabble.
Rather than bickering about whether the data provide evidence of racial preju-
dice, the trustworthy police department and the trusting community can move
on to a more important question: What do we do now?
To be clear, the dysfunctional relationship between law enforcement and
African Americans presents a Gordian knot of massive proportions, one that is
unlikely to be unraveled with a discrete, singular solution, and is impossible to
fully address in this short piece.  In the following pages, however, I suggest a
potential theoretical structure for future analysis of police–minority discontent,
as well as an example of how it might apply in practice.  Part II introduces the
concept of institutional design as a framework for analyzing and improving law
enforcement performance and community relations, and describes two policing
theories aimed at reducing police misconduct and incorporating affected neigh-
borhoods into the process of policy formation and review.  Part III then offers a
brief example of how the framework of institutional design might apply to a
hypothetical police department.
24. See infra Part III.
25. Of course, some individuals and groups may have no other choice but to litigate misconduct
when facing a recalcitrant police department.  See infra Part IV.  Moreover, litigation occasionally leads
to systematic change in law enforcement, although through the slow and often unreceptive court proc-
ess rather than the relative expedience of police–citizen collaboration.
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II
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest among social scientists in
the role of institutions in society.26  This revived curiosity with the design of
institutions, sometimes referred to as the “new institutionalism” or “new
constitutionalism,” can be found in the schools of economics, political science,
sociology, and their cognates.27  These disciplines are not solely concerned with
static analysis of how various institutions function or their impact on groups and
individuals, but also with the ways in which institutions can be (re)designed to
serve valuable social goals, both in themselves and as part of larger political
regimes.28  In other words, a theory of institutional design takes a “designer’s
perspective”29 on how to improve the internal performance of a given institution
as well as its external interaction with other institutions, collectives, or individu-
als.
Part of the contemporary interest in institutional design is grounded in a
desire to recapture the wisdom of classic political theory, specifically that philo-
sophical inquiry should have actual meaning and application in the real world.30
For adherents to the new institutionalism, the “unhappy divorce” between
theory and practice is particularly evident in American law schools.  “There,
students are taught the arts of close reading and rhetoric, and made to remem-
ber legal doctrine as propounded in legal cases,” argue political scientists Ste-
phen Elkin and Karol Sołtan, meaning that “[o]nly a few students emerge from
their schooling as more than resourceful technicians.”31 Absent from legal edu-
cation is an understanding of why and how political institutions are constituted,
and, of equal importance, why and how they should be reformed.32
The current focus on institutional design is also a reaction to post-modern-
ism and the battle-axe of deconstruction.  The “masters of suspicion”33—Marx,
26. David L. Weimer, Institutional Design: Overview, in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 2 (David L.
Weimer ed., 1995).
27. See Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and Their Design, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN 1–20 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996); Weimer, supra note 26, at 2–4; see generally A NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM: DESIGNING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR A GOOD SOCIETY (Stephen L.
Elkin & Karol Edward Sołtan eds. 1993).
28. Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Sołtan, Preface, in A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note
27, at vii–viii [hereinafter Elkin & Sołtan, Preface]; Stephen L. Elkin, Constitutionalism: Old and New,
in A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 27, at 33–34 [hereinafter Elkin, Old and New]; Philip
Pettit, Institutional Design and Rational Choice, in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 26, at 55; Karol
Edward Sołtan, What Is the New Constitutionalism, in A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 27, at
4, 16 [hereinafter Sołtan, What Is]; Introduction to a New Constitutionalism, in A NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 27, at 1–2; Weimer, supra note 26, at 2 .
29. Sołtan, What Is, supra note 28, at 4, 16.
30. Elkin & Sołtan, Preface, supra note 28, at vii.
31. Id.
32. This is not an entirely accurate criticism of legal education.  Constitutional law and administra-
tive law, for instance, arguably deal with the institutional design of the national government and
administrative agencies, respectively.
33. See PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 32–36
(1970).
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Nietzsche, Freud, and their modern disciples—demonstrated that much of what
appears analytical and disinterested masks the hidden realities of power and
domination.  Through their constant questioning and criticism, deconstructing
the very foundations of our social world, the post-modern skeptics sought to
destroy the false consciousness that enveloped society.  Today, however, the
hermeneutics of suspicion seems to have run its course.  The hidden underbelly
of law, custom, and artifacts of the past has been exposed and, where appropri-
ate, deemed a fraud and oppressor.  Yet taken much further, post-modernism
just becomes nihilism in drag.  Institutional designers seem to be saying that
they accept the post-modern critique, but now it is time to focus efforts on con-
structive endeavors.
An “institution” is nothing more than a “stable, valued, recurring pattern of
behavior,”34 but for present purposes, it specifically refers to an official entity
empowered to prescribe and execute authoritative decisions.35  In turn, “design”
can be defined not only as constructing an entirely new institution but also the
more common task of assessing an existing institution and making modifications
to improve its performance.36  “Institutional design,” then, is the process of cre-
ating or modifying the rules and incentives of an official entity to achieve cer-
tain substantive ends, with the design process predicated on an understanding
of the normative goals of a particular institution.37  This morality guides both the
assessment and modification of an institution and its agents—whether goals are
sufficiently realized, and if not, the necessary changes for a better fit between
ends and means.38
Setting normative goals for almost any public institution will present a
highly contested endeavor, even more so when dealing with critical functions
like law enforcement.  Nonetheless, let me suggest a general objective that
might guide the project of institutional design in the present setting: creating a
more democratic police force.  For the most part, we can all agree that democ-
34. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 12 (1968); see also
Weimer, supra note 26, at 2–3, 5; Randall L. Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of Institutions: Impli-
cations for Design, in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 26, at 63–64; John S. Dryzek, The Informal
Logic of Institutional Design, in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 26, at 103–04; Goodin, supra note
27, at 19–24; Pettit, supra note 28, at 55.
35. An institution in this sense “deals with the control of the use of force within a society and the
maintenance of internal and external peace of the boundaries of the society, as well as control of the
mobilization of resources for the implementation of various goals and the articulation and setting up of
certain goals for the collectivity.” Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Social Institutions: The Concept, in 14
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 410 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
36. Goodin, supra note 27, at 30–34; Christine Lambert & Nick Oatley, Governance, Institutional
Capacity and Planning for Growth, in URBAN GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND SOCIAL
MILIEUX 126–27 (Göran Cars et al. eds., 2002); Pettit, supra note 28, at 55.
37. “A well-designed institution,” philosopher Robert Goodin suggests, “would be one that is both
internally consistent and externally in harmony with the rest of the social order in which it is set.”
Goodin, supra note 27, at 37.
38. Russell Hardin, Institutional Morality, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note
27, at 126–27.
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racy is a good thing—or, at least, the best choice given the other options39—and
still differ as to its proper meaning.  But for present purposes, I will define and
unpack the term as follows: Democracy is popular rule of government, typically
through the election of representatives empowered to fulfill the will of the citi-
zenry.  A democratic state can have no other master than the people, since its
very legitimacy is founded on consent of the governed.40  This consensual or
contractual vision of democracy presumes a give-and-take between government
and citizen: The state is authorized to wield the power of coercive force, but
always in service of the common good and only to the extent that official actions
are ultimately accountable to the people.41
Among other things, however, modern democracy faces a pair of challenges,
the first being interest pluralism.  Contemporary western societies are not
monolithic in values and viewpoints but instead contain an assortment of ide-
ologies, forwarded by individuals and groups, each seeking to advance its own
objectives and capture scarce resources.42  The aggregation of plural interests
and the allotment of public wealth tend to be made through majoritarian rule: If
legislation is supported by a majority of elected representatives, for instance,
the will of the people is supposedly fulfilled.43  Yet pure majoritarianism has the
potential to devolve into a method of oppression, where certain interest groups
persecute unpopular minorities or use their sway over government to extract
resources from the less powerful.44
39. “Democracy is the worst form of Government,” Winston Churchill once quipped, “except all
those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”  THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL
QUOTATIONS 83 (Antony Jay ed., 2d ed. 2001) (from speech in the House of Commons, 11 November
1947).
40. JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 12–17 (1996) (discussing consent as basis for gov-
ernment legitimacy); Stephen L. Elkin, Constitutionalism’s Successor, in A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM,
supra note 27, at 130 [hereinafter Elkin, Constitutionalism’s Successor]; cf. Luna, Transparent Policing,
supra note 4, at 1121–31 (discussing the meaning of democracy in context of criminal justice).
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING: AVOIDING VIOLENCE BETWEEN
POLICE AND CITIZENS 14 (1993) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING](“Today, the policing
function is viewed increasingly in terms of the ‘contractual’ relationship with the people.  That is, given
the impact which law enforcement has on the community, police service delivery should be based on
community needs, safety concerns, and on relentless enforcement of the law against criminals.”);
KLEINIG, supra note 40, at 209–29 (discussing different views of accountability); NEYROUD &
BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 146–50 (similar); Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1121–31 (dis-
cussing democratic accountability in criminal justice).
42. John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in NOMOS XLII: DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS 79, 82–83 (2000); John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 234–38, 249–50 (1989) [hereinafter Rawls, Overlapping Consensus]; John
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 765–66, 770 (1997) [hereinafter
Rawls, Public Reason]; Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1122–23; see generally Bernard
Grofman & Robert Stockwell, Institutional Design in Plural Societies: Mitigating Ethnic Conflict and
Fostering Stable Democracy (unpublished draft 2001), available at
http://www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/ stock.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
43. Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1122.
44. Id. at 1122–23; Grofman & Stockwell, supra note 42.
LUNA_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  10:10 AM
192 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:183
The second challenge to democracy is the unavoidable reality of discretion.45
The limits of language and the variability of context prevent lawmakers from
anticipating and detailing the appropriate execution of their dictates in all
potential scenarios.  For this reason (and others46), law typically will be scripted
at a level of generality, with executive agencies such as police departments
empowered to determine the proper scope and means of enforcement.47  But
sweeping grants of discretion—the authority to choose between two or more
courses of conduct48—tend to have troublesome consequences.  With great lati-
tude of action, state enforcers can become the law unto themselves.  Absent
limits or guidelines, they may be arbitrary or self-interested, without regard for
concepts of right and common welfare.49  Broad discretionary powers can even
amount to a type of “serfdom,” as Theodore Lowi has written, where law
enforcement becomes a patron converting public policy into largesse for
favored individuals or groups.50
These challenges can be addressed, however, by enriching the meaning of
democracy.  To begin with, democratic government need not be synonymous
with majority rule.  In fact, if democracy contemplates consent and
empowerment of the people in furtherance of the common good, pure majori-
tarianism is a brutal, ineffective means of achieving this goal.  Classic scholars
recognized as much, distinguishing between ochlocratia, the mob-like rule of
the majority, versus democratia, popular government pursuant to constitutional
procedures.51  The former places raw power directly in the hands of the multi-
tude without the leavening force of virtuous representatives or countermajori-
tarian checks and balances, conceiving a government wholly subject to the
uninhibited, often vacillating desires of the masses.  In contrast, the latter
understands democracy as consensual rule, that state actions that touch all
ought to be supported by all,52 and, conversely, actions that touch few ought to
be accepted by those so affected.
Popular consent does not necessarily require nationwide unanimity or some
heightened level of consensus for each and every policy decision.  It can be
accomplished by constituting substantive rights as part of the social compact,
45. Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative
Power, in A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 27, at 149; Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note
4, at 1132.
46. See, e.g., Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1138–39 (noting arguments for intentional
statutory vagueness).
47. Id. at 1108, 1138–39.
48. Id. at 1133.
49. Id. at 1108–20, 1144–48; Elkin, Old and New, supra note 28, at 22; Lowi, supra note 45, at 150–
51.
50. See Lowi, supra note 45, at 150–51, 170–71; see also THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979); THEODORE J. LOWI,
THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1st ed.
1969).
51. Philip Pettit, Democracy, Electoral and Contestatory, in NOMOS XLII, supra note 42, at 139–40.
52. Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus debet supportari: “That which touches or concerns all ought to
be supported by all.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1254 (6th ed. 1990).
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protecting individuals and groups regardless of the wishes of the majority.53
Obviously, government agents should respect both the people they police and
the laws that they are charged to uphold, regardless of the individual or rule in
question.54  But consensual democracy is also furthered by establishing fair pro-
cedures that are transsubstantive in nature, assuring due process in the creation
and enforcement of law.55  Among other things, this process should provide a
forum for discourse and deliberation by the people, not only because an oppor-
tunity to be heard seems a necessary corollary of consent, but because of the
occasion that dialogue affords for persuasion and compromise.56 Moreover,
rules and procedures should be placed on the exercise of discretion, making the
act of enforcement more law-like, more amenable to oversight, and more apt to
be the product of popular consent.57  Finally, law enforcement should be local to
the maximum extent possible, recognizing the kernel of truth in American fed-
eralism that government closer to the people is more likely to serve the unique
needs of a particular jurisdiction. More importantly, localized policing,
accountable to the affected neighborhood, helps assure that discrepant
enforcement is the product of consent rather than imposition.58
With this understanding of democracy and the goal of creating a more
democratic police force—one based on, inter alia, participation of affected citi-
zens and active opposition to officer misconduct—it is possible to construct a
framework for implementing institutional design in the context of law enforce-
ment.  Relevant literature seems to suggest two strands or schools of thought
for designing institutions, although this dual classification is sometimes less than
53. Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1123.
54. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (“Nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.”);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Our government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If
the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
unto himself; it invites anarchy.”).
55. Ferejohn, supra note 42, at 77–79; Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 540–44, 562–
625 (discussing importance of procedural justice and “transparency” in law enforcement); Rawls,
Overlapping Consensus, supra note 42, at 244–45, 248–49 (discussing concept of overlapping consensus
arrived at by just procedures).
56. Ferejohn, supra note 42, at 77–79; Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 42, at 771–73; Rawls,
Overlapping Consensus, supra note 42, at 244 (“Other great values fall under the idea of free public
reason, and are expressed in the guidelines for public inquiry and in the steps taken to secure that such
inquiry is free and public, as well as informed and reasonable.”); Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra
note 4, at 575–89 (discussing importance of deliberation and opportunity to be heard); Luna, Transpar-
ent Policing, supra note 4, at 1154–94 (discussing need for transparency and deliberative interaction
between government and governed).
57. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 81–91 (1964) (discussing rule of law’s
requirement that law on the books and law in action not diverge); Elkin, Old and New, supra note 28, at
23; Pettit, supra note 51, at 129; Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 540–44 (discussing
Fuller’s conception of the rule of law).
58. See, e.g., Reenah L. Kim, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The Need for
Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.–
C.L. L. REV. 461, 475–78, 494–95 (2001); cf. Grofman & Stockwell, supra note 42.
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explicit.59  The first strand draws upon theories of economics, sociology, and
cognitive psychology, and is concerned with the causes of individual and group
action.60  As applied to institutional design of law enforcement, the objective is
to determine potential rationales for police misconduct and methods for limit-
ing such behavior.  For lack of a better name, this approach will be referred to
as “behavioral policing” theory.  The second strand is grounded in moral and
political philosophy (as well as social psychology, to the extent that it provides
an empirical basis for relevant theoretical judgments).61  Application of this
approach to law enforcement, which I have previously labeled “transparent
policing,”62 focuses on the predicates of legitimate state action and the means of
increasing the legitimacy of law enforcement in distrustful, disaffected commu-
nities.
A. Behavioral Policing
According to Professor Sołtan, “[i]nstitutional design must take into account
the basic limits of human nature: the human tendency toward error and fallibil-
ity, the strength of self-interest against the public good, the power of passions
against reason.”63 An appropriate starting point to examine human cognition
and behavior is the classic “Chicago School” of legal analysis—often referred to
as “law and economics”—founded in the concepts of rational actors, agency
costs, and economic efficiency.  This approach assumes that individuals are
rational, that choices among various options will be self-interested with an eye
59. Sołtan, What Is, supra note 28, at 5, 13–16 (noting two “ways of locating this new constitution-
alism”); Introduction to a New Constitutionalism, supra note 28, at 2 (noting “two principal strands of
constitutionalist thinking”); cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Deconstructing Debate, Reconstructing Law, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 682 (2002) (describing two ideological perspectives, “idealists” and “realists”).
60. See, e.g., Sołtan, What Is, supra note 28, at 13–16 (discussing themes of institutional design con-
cerned with human motivations and behavior).  This strand roughly comports with the “realist” camp
of administrative law: “The realist approach attempts to understand how private interests are aggre-
gated to produce discrete legal results.  The realist researcher inquires into the material interests and
strategic behavior of individuals, firms, and groups, and seeks to understand how interests and decision
rules combine to yield administrative decisions.”  Mashaw, supra note 59, at 684.  Institutional design
from “the realist’s perspective” would be aimed at creating “a set of control mechanisms” against unde-
sirable behavior.  Id. at 683.
61. See, e.g., Introduction to a New Constitutionalism, supra note 28, at 2 (mentioning “strand of
constitutionalist thinking” that “takes its bearing from a perceived need to limit the arbitrary exercise
of political power”).  This strand seems consistent with the “idealist” camp of administrative law:
The idealists understand governmental organization as a process by which public values are
converted into legislative norms which are then realized through administrative implementa-
tion. . . .  [T]he idealist sees the job of legal institutional design as one of maintaining open
debate and civic equality.  The basic idea is simply to make government responsive to the
wishes of the electorate within a legal culture that establishes certain constitutional fundamen-
tals, fundamentals that focus attention on citizenship and the protection of individual liber-
ties. . . .  When designing administrative institutions, the idealist is primarily interested in
assuring . . . transparency in administrative processes, and the accountability of administrative
decisionmaking to all who are either benefited or burdened by administrative action.
Mashaw, supra note 59, at 683–84.
62. See generally Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4.  A better label might be “deliberative
policing” theory, but I will nonetheless adhere to my previous convention.
63. Sołtan, What Is, supra note 28, at 14.
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toward increasing personal utility.64  Because organizations are necessarily com-
posed of individuals, an agency cost is created: Employees (agents) will tend to
maximize their own self-interest, often to the detriment of the institution or
those it is intended to benefit (principals).65
“Public choice” theory—a sub-discipline integrating economics and political
science—accepts the rational-actor paradigm and associated organizational
costs, and contemplates the use of institutional design to create an incentive
structure that prevents or restricts self-interested conduct by individuals within
the institution.66 The goal of public choice theory is to use various instruments to
control employee behavior and thereby maximize the aggregate social benefit
from the institution67—in the present case, limiting police misconduct.  Assum-
ing economic rationality, an officer might misbehave for direct personal gain,
like taking a bribe, or for indirect benefit, such as suspicionless searches in pur-
suit of contraband and arrests, believing that such behavior will eventually lead
to promotion.
Given the underlying economic assumptions, deterrence serves as the pri-
mary means of channeling behavior, where the level of punishment assigned to
misconduct acts as a “price” subject to an enforcement discount rate.68  The
expected penalty, in turn, is a function of two variables: the level of punishment
and the chance of getting caught.  A rational actor will weigh the discounted
punishment against other opportunities and will then choose the course of con-
duct that maximizes his personal utility.  Institutional design can therefore
64. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3–4 (5th ed.  1998)
(“[E]conomics is the science of rational choice in a world—our world—in which resources are limited in
relation to human wants.  The task of economics, so defined, is to explore the implications of assuming
that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions—what we shall call his “self-inter-
est.”); see also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)
(A[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable
set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of
markets.”).  Economic analysis is not necessarily blind to irrational conduct but instead assumes that
any deviations from the rational actor model are random in nature and therefore cancel each other out
in the long run. But see text accompanying infra note 80.
65. Goodin, supra note 27, at 12.
66. See James W. Caesar, Reconstructing Political Science, in A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 27, at 49–54; Elkin, Old and New, supra note 28, at 27–31; Sołtan, What Is, supra note 28, at 9–12;
Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J.
1277, 1281–82 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 551–552, 562–63 (2002).  See generally JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK
(Dennis C.  Mueller ed., 1997); MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW:
READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997).
67. This “social efficiency” analysis involves calculating individual gains and losses from a given
policy, aggregating these costs and benefits by relevant population, and then comparing the resulting
state of affairs to social conditions under some other policy choice.  See Russell Hardin, Magic on the
Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1987, 1987 (1996).
68. Cf.  Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 349
(1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence] (“Individuals commit crimes, this account predicts, when
the expected utility of law-breaking exceeds the expected disutility of punishment.”).
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influence police behavior by: (1) increasing the punishment for officer miscon-
duct, or (2) increasing the probability of detection through enhanced
surveillance and oversight.  Despite the prevalence of deterrence-based pun-
ishment regimes, institutional design might also influence the rational police
officer through an award system, providing some type of incentive for model
behavior.  In theory, at least, increases in salary or the chance of promotion
should impact an officer’s choices in favor of pro-social behavior.69  In addition,
individuals might be rewarded for exposing police misconduct (whistleblowing),
which augments deterrence by increasing the probability that such misconduct
will be revealed in the first place.  Finally, if police abuses are the unintended
consequence of performance standards, such as the number of seizures or
arrests, administrators can simply change the evaluation methodology by elimi-
nating or de-emphasizing such criteria.
Economic-based theories like public choice have their advantages, as Pro-
fessor Lawrence Lessig has noted: “The virtue of economics is its economy.  Its
sparse ontology.  Its simplicity.  With a few blocks, it aims to build the world.”70
But the clean lines of this approach also serve as its major drawback.  Econom-
ics is thin; its rendition of human behavior fails to pick up systematic inefficien-
cies and apparent irrationality in the real world.71  Two relatively new fields of
legal study have attempted to compensate for the limitations intrinsic in pure
economic analysis.
The first approach, sometimes referred to as “behavioral law and econom-
ics,” co-opts the findings of cognitive psychology and suggests that individuals
suffer from certain intellectual boundaries—bounded rationality,72 bounded
willpower,73 and bounded self-interest.74  Put simply, people do not always
69. Cf.  Tracey L. Meares, Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 852 (1995) (offering a “proposal to influence and struc-
ture a prosecutor’s discretion and to limit prosecutorial misconduct through financial incentives”).
70. Lawrence Lessig, Social Meanings and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2181 (1998).
71. See, e.g., Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Eco-
nomic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 317–22 (1977) (criticizing rationality assumption of classic eco-
nomics).  See also Caesar, supra note 66, at 52–53; Elkin, Old and New, supra note 28, at 29–31; Goodin,
supra note 27, at 17; Sołtan, What Is, supra note 28, at 15–16; Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 66, at
552–53, 563.
72. The following are examples of biases and heuristics that result in “bounded rationality.” (1)
Availability: Individuals estimate the probability of a particular outcome based on the mental “avail-
ability” of the same or similar incidents—in other words, “how easily such instances come to mind.”
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1518 (1998).  (2) Representativeness: People tend to evaluate a particular event
based on its representation of some other event, providing “a mental shortcut by which causes are
treated as resembling their effects.” Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 706 (1999).  (3) Case-Based Heuristics: Individuals often make deci-
sions through less-than-rigorous case analogies.  They “make assessments on the basis of previous cases
rather than through particularized assessments of relevant costs and benefits.”  Cass R. Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1189–90 (1997).
73. The following are examples of biases and heuristics which result in “bounded willpower.” (1)
Motivational Distortions: People are often motivated by addictions, habits, and other myopic behavior
that conflicts with rational self-interest, where “the preferences are endogenous to the act of consump-
tion and [the] short-term costs of altering behavior may be overvalued when compared with the long-
term gains.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129,
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pursue their own economically defined benefit.  Instead, they adopt biases and
heuristics in their everyday life, and are often influenced by “cascades” of
information, regardless of accuracy.75  Humans are smart animals, but animals
nonetheless, possessing faulty memories and limited computational abilities.76
To overcome this bounded rationality, people utilize rules-of-thumb and mental
shortcuts when faced with difficult decisions or unwieldy informational input.77
Individuals also display constraints on personal willpower, frequently acting in
ways that are clearly at odds with their long-term welfare.78  People can be
tempted by some opportunity or addicted to a particular course of conduct, and
they may maintain a myopic approach to certain issues.  Most interestingly,
individuals do not necessarily act in their own self-interest; they “are both nicer
and (when they are not treated fairly) more spiteful than the agents postulated
by [economic] theory.”79
The goal of behavioral law and economics is to discern those biases and
heuristics that effect the process of decision-making.  Empirical work suggests
that certain cognitive phenomena are systematic in nature rather than the
random pattern of “mistakes” assumed by classic law and economics.80  For
instance, psychologists have traced racial prejudice to the brain’s dependence
on schema or organizing principles, with race serving as a cue for decision-
1139 (1986).  (2) Hyperbolic Discount Rates: Individuals often ignore or systematically underestimate
future costs.  In other words, “[f]uture risks and rewards are discounted more heavily than standard
economic analysis would indicate, suggesting a bias toward consumption and against deferred gratifica-
tion.” Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholar-
ship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1505 (1998).
74. The following are examples of biases and heuristics which result in “bounded self-interest.” (1)
Fairness and Spitefulness: Individuals want to be seen as fair even if it leaves them worse off from a
utility maximizing viewpoint.  For example, “people will not necessarily accept all bargains that benefit
them.  They may reject a bargain they perceive to be unfair, even at some cost to themselves.”  Jennifer
Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1775 (1998).  Con-
versely, individuals are often spiteful when they feel unfairly treated and may take vengeance regard-
less of economic cost.  See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 72, at 1495–96.  (2) Civic Responsi-
bility: People sometimes make choices depending on what hat they wear, citizen versus consumer.  For
example, “citizens may seek to implement individual and collective aspirations in political behavior but
not in private consumption. . . .  People may, in their capacity as political actors, attempt to promote
altruistic or other-regarding goals, which diverge from the self-interested preferences sometimes char-
acteristic of markets.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 960
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
75. The availability heuristic often produces “cascade effects,” where “expressed perceptions trig-
ger social responses that make these perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their rising
availability in public discourse.”  Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 72, at 685.  As a particular perception
becomes more available to the general population, more people will tend to adopt that perception
regardless of accuracy.  In turn, “an informational cascade occurs when people with little personal
information on a particular matter base their own beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others.”  Id. at 685–
86.  When people reiterate a particular understanding of events, others will tend to accept its veracity
and jump on the information bandwagon.
76. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 72, at 1477; Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 66, at 555–58.
77. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 66, at 555–56.
78. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 72, at 1479.
79. Id.
80. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 66, at 555–58.
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making.81  Although care must be taken in extrapolating from such findings and
crafting solutions,82 some general prescriptions would seem to have relevance
for institutional design in law enforcement.  To begin with, police might estab-
lish an intensive screening process to cull those potential employees who suffer
from unacceptable forms of cognitive limitation,83 such as overt (or even latent)
racial prejudice.  Those individuals who survive a cognitional vetting might then
be placed through a training program particularly geared toward revealing
biases or heuristics that adversely affect the duties of policing.84  Availability,
representativeness, and case-based heuristics,85 for example, might lead an offi-
cer to assume the criminality or dangerousness of an individual based on inac-
curate cues, such as race or socio-economic status.  In addition, police depart-
ments might set rules to counter those mental shortcuts that are either
inaccurate or against public policy,86 thereby forcing the officer to consciously
recognize both the potential bias and the contradictory rule.
Cognitive screening is also important for the process of job assignment and
promotion, helping to determine those individuals who have the disposition and
level of expertise needed for a particular position.87  Law enforcement agents
who are terrific beat cops will not necessarily make great supervisors and vice
versa, while an individual’s temperament may simply be inappropriate for a
given jurisdiction or type of police work.  Regardless of position or proficiency,
cognitive errors may still persist, and for this, relevant literature seems to sug-
gest that a constant process of review and evaluation offers the best solution.
To the extent possible, data should be collected and analyzed on an ongoing
basis, forcing law enforcement to reexamine its judgements and make appropri-
ate corrections.88  Likewise, overconfidence in a particular policy by police
administrators can be checked by institutionalized “devil’s advocacy,” with an
appointed individual or group required to present opposing viewpoints.89  The
strongest check on cognitive errors in the present context, however, is public
participation and external oversight of law enforcement.  “Having to assess the
force of criticisms coming from a variety of perspectives, and craft a persuasive
response to those criticisms,” suggest Professors Jeffrey Rachlinski and Cynthia
81. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 132–33 (2d ed. 1991); Rachlinski
& Farina, supra note 66, at 556.
82. Biases, heuristics, and cascades can be exceptionally useful in theory, explaining a good deal of
otherwise economically irrational behavior.  Nonetheless, their application to the real world remains
uncertain and somewhat treacherous. See Arlen, supra note 74, at 1768–69, 1777; Langevoort, supra
note 73, at 1520–23.  Behavioral law and economics can only make (highly) educated guesses at the
likely outcomes.
83. Philosopher Philip Pettit has referred to this as a “screen” of the “complier-centered strategy”
for institutional design.  Pettit, supra note 28, at 58–59.
84. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 66, at 558–61, 610–11.
85. See supra notes 72–74.
86. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 66, at 561–62.
87. Pettit, supra note 28, at 58–59; Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 66, at 561–62.
88. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 66, at 592–93, 596–600.
89. Id. at 561–62.
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Farina, “helps an agency to step outside of the decision-making process.”90
When the issue is police legitimacy and misconduct, there are no better critics
than affected community members and their representatives.
A second supplement to the classic Chicago School employs a hybrid of
economic and sociological theory.  Pure economic analysis, grounded in meth-
odological individualism,91 largely ignores powerful social influences and the
human pursuit of status.92  An alternative approach—referred to as “law and
social norms” or “the New Chicago School”93—rejects traditional scholarship’s
legal-centric view that law is the only restraint on conduct worthy of study.94  As
a practical matter, society can control behavior in any number of ways.  The
legal command is one option, of course, but it can be ineffective, counterpro-
ductive, or simply oppressive when considered in isolation.  For these reasons,
social norm advocates tend to look beyond the law for effective regulation, with
official pronouncements often serving as complements or stimulation for nonle-
gal sources of authority.95
As acknowledged by its supporters, the law and social norms approach faces
various unresolved issues—most notably, the appropriate definition of
“norm.”96  But for present purposes, norms can be defined as generally fol-
90. Id. at 588–89.
91. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL. STUD. 537,
539 (1998) [hereinafter Ellickson, Law and Economics] (critiquing pure economic analysis and defining
methodological individualism as “the assumption that individuals are the only agents of human
action”).
92. See, e.g., id.; see also Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 68, at 350–51; Dan M. Kahan, Social
Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 610 (1998); Richard H. Pildes,
Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 725, 726 (1998).  There are, of course, drawbacks to the introduction of “messy” sociology into
“clean” economics.  Richard Posner reminds scholars that “too many bells and whistles will stop the
analytic engine in its track.”  Richard A. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on
Ellickson, 65 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 57, 62 (1989).  Judge Posner, however, does not reject outright the
possibility of non-economic variables but instead argues that a “commitment to a relatively simple eco-
nomic model, one that does not supply a facile explanation for regularity (or peculiarity) in human
behavior, forces the analyst to think hard before discarding the possibility that the behavior under scru-
tiny may indeed be rational in a straightforward sense.”  Id.
93. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 661 (1998) [hereinafter
Lessig, New Chicago School].  For discussion of the rise and status of social norm scholarship, see
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 343–
46 (1997) [hereinafter McAdams, Origin, Development] and Ellickson, Law and Economics, supra note
91, at 542–43, 546–49.  Cf. Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra at 673–74 (suggesting that there may
be first- and second-generation norm theories); Ellickson, Law and Economics, supra note 91, at 549
(noting “that the school’s relative confidence in state norm-shaping is not universally shared”); The
New Chicago School: Myth or Reality?, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1998) (questioning whether
the New Chicago School is more myth than reality).
94. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
137–55 (1991).
95. See Lessig, New Chicago School, supra note 91, at 672; Ellickson, Law and Economics, supra
note 91, at 548; see also McAdams, Origin, Development, supra note 93, at 340.
96. “The concept of a ‘norm’ is slippery,” Professor Eric Posner suggests, “and scholars use it in
different ways; a defect shared by all writings on this subject.”  Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996).  “Part of the problem is that the word ‘norm’
is used to describe many different kinds of phenomena.  This might just be because the concept of
‘norm’ is intrinsically slippery in a way that the concept of, say, ‘statute’ is not.”  Id. at 1743; see also
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lowed, nonlegal obligations.  They are spurred not by official coercion but by an
internal appreciation of duty, an external fear of social reprobation, or both.
Laws can support existing norms and even foster new ones, but the primary
source of compliance is extra-legal.  Norms, therefore, are informal obligations
backed by informal sanctions of society or self.97  Of particular importance are
the social norms of one’s peer group, which influence individual behavior
through the human pursuit of social acceptance.98  Individuals naturally seek the
esteem and affection of those who are most significant in their lives.  Although
the “New Chicago School” may be of recent vintage, the significance of social
approval is not—Adam Smith recognized as much almost a quarter of a millen-
nium ago.99
The most prominent application of the law and social norms approach to
criminal justice is Professor Dan Kahan’s “social influence conception of deter-
rence.”100  Consistent with standard norm theory, Kahan argues that an individ-
ual’s perception of peer beliefs, values, and conduct will affect his own behav-
ior.  In other words, what other people say and do will have social influence on
an individual’s actions.  For instance, “individuals are much more likely to
commit crimes when they perceive that criminal activity is widespread.”101  Law
can alter these perceptions through its social meaning, expressing a neighbor-
hood’s attitude toward criminal behavior.  By cracking down on prostitutes,
pimps, pushers, gang-bangers, and other clear signs of disorder, criminal law can
change the disposition of onlookers: Crime, even petty crime, is unacceptable in
this neighborhood.102  Such public disorder has an anti-social influence on resi-
dents who witness pandering and drug exchanges in their front yards.  The solu-
tion, Kahan suggests, is to drive manifest criminality from public view in a sort
of out-of-sight, out-of-mind approach to policing.
McAdams, Origin, Development, supra note 93, at 350, 376; Richard H. McAdams, Accounting for
Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 625, 634–35.  “It is worrisome that the new norms scholars do not agree on
basic terms, not to mention analytic frameworks,” Professor Robert Ellickson notes.  “The waters are
so muddy that many writers on norms feel compelled to start by proffering their own definition of
norm.”  Ellickson, Law and Economics, supra note 91, at 549.
97. Or at least this is a definition that will work for present purposes.  See Richard A. Posner,
Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365 (1997) (offering a
similar definition).
98. Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725, 762 (1990).
99. According to Smith:
Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and
an original aversion to offend his brethren.  She taught him to feel pleasure in their favorable,
and pain in their unfavorable regard.  She rendered their approbation most flattering and
most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most
offensive.
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 115 (David Daiches Raphael & Alec Lawrence
Macfie eds., Liberty Classics 1982) (1759).
100. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 68, at 351.
101. Id. at 350.
102. See id. at 351.
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To be clear, Professor Kahan’s scholarship in this area has been exception-
ally controversial.103  But putting aside substantial criticism, could his “social
influence conception of deterrence” apply to police misconduct?  Consider the
following redaction:
[Police] are much more likely to commit [misconduct] when they perceive that [such]
activity is widespread.  In that circumstance, they are likely to infer that the risk of
being caught for [misconduct] is low.  They might also conclude that relatively little
stigma or reputational cost attaches to being [abusive]; indeed, if [mis]behavior is
common among their peers, they may even view such activity as status enhancing.
Finally, in a community in which [misconduct] is perceived to be rampant, [police] are
less likely to form moral aversions to [such misconduct].104
This interpretation certainly comports with the apparent causes of law enforce-
ment misconduct in minority neighborhoods, such as deviant police sub-cultures
and the gang-like nature of some police units.105
If we accept norm theory and the social influence conception of deterrence
(or at least its application to law enforcers), a number of strategies might inhibit
police abuses.  First and foremost, administrators and external oversight agen-
cies could implement a crackdown on even low-level misconduct, sending the
message that there is no such thing as an acceptable or trivial abuse of power.
This signal might also be spread throughout the department by broadly pub-
lishing the officer’s name, misconduct, and resulting punishment.  Broadcasting
this information both in police circles and in public is consistent with one of
Professor Kahan’s favorite topics—“shaming penalties.”106  These sanctions
might work on a number of levels: they “convey condemnation in dramatic and
unequivocal terms”;107 they reaffirm the primacy of ethical policing and the
social bond of “good cops”; and they draw upon the typical law enforcement
agent’s strong aversion to being labeled a thug and criminal.  Finally, adminis-
trators might break up troublesome police units with a history of abuse.  Not
unlike anti-loitering ordinances that disperse public gatherings of gang mem-
103. See, e.g., Bernard H. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998); see also Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated
Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
215; David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice
Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999); Toni Massaro, The Gang’s Not Here, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 25
(1998); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order–Maintenance
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINLOGY 775 (1999); Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punish-
ment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751 (1999).  But see Dan M.  Kahan, Unthinkable Misrep-
resentations: A Response to Tonry, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1933 (1999) (responding to criticism).
104. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 68, at 350.  The original quote contained the words
“crime,” “criminal,” and “criminality.”
105. See supra notes 17 & 18.
106. See, e.g., Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 68, at 384–85; Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).
107. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 68, at 350.
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bers,108 disbanding groups of officers with a propensity for abusive behavior
interferes with the norms of police misconduct.
B. Transparent Policing
As mentioned previously, the second strand of institutional design theory is
founded upon moral and political philosophy.  In particular, design advocates
contend that institutions established within constitutional democracies should
be committed to discourse and deliberation.  They must have a “deliberative
core,”109 serving as “communit[ies] of inquiry,”110 always recognizing that
“[d]eliberation is the lifeblood of democratic politics.”111  Such an understanding
identifies democracy in general and institutional design in particular with a
process of intelligent adaptation, reflecting upon experience and deliberating on
the future.112  It is also seen as a component of public education, positioning citi-
zens in relation to one another as decision-makers through reasoned dis-
course.113  This all seems fairly abstract, and it is—but as suggested earlier, the
entire project of institutional design argues that philosophy need not be as dis-
tant from practical reality as is often presumed.  Moral and political theorizing
can be, in the words of philosopher William Galston, “the collective effort of
preparing ourselves to recognize what is worthy of our assent.”114
In previous works, I have attempted to partially bridge this gap, crafting
relevant principles of moral and political philosophy that can then be applied to
the practice of law enforcement.115  This approach, which I call “transparent
policing,” essentially contends that affected citizens should be able to observe
and scrutinize the judgments of law enforcement, as well as their underlying
rationales, and to have a say in the formation and reformulation of these deci-
sions.  In reaching this conclusion, my conception of transparency draws upon
various theories, from procedural justice to civic republicanism, all with the goal
of developing values or principles that can guide law enforcement.  Although
discussed elsewhere, the following will briefly describe the theoretical under-
pinnings and basic principles of transparent policing.
108. Cf. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights are Wrong: The Paradox of Unwanted
Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 15–17 (Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999); Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis, supra note 6, at 1160; Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v.
Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 198.
109. Elkin, Constitutionalism’s Successor, supra note 40, at 134.
110. Charles W. Anderson, Pragmatic Liberalism, the Rule of Law, and the Pluralist Regime, in A
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 27, at 106–07.
111. Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo, Introduction, in NOMOS XLII, supra note 42, at 2.
112. Anderson, supra note 110, at 106–07.
113. Elkin, Constitutionalism’s Successor, supra note 40, at 137–38.
114.  WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE
LIBERAL STATE  35 (1991).
115. See generally, Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4; Luna, Transparent Policing, supra
note 4.
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1. Theoretical Underpinnings.  The deontology of Immanuel Kant embod-
ied the Enlightenment’s central article of faith: The common man is capable of
reflecting and deliberating on issues of public importance.116  By rejecting the
idea of the “noble lie”—that officials must necessarily deceive the citizenry to
obtain its loyalty117—Kant provided support for the notion of open govern-
ment.118  In particular, he offered a “publicity” principle that required all actions
affecting the rights of other individuals be capable of surviving public scrutiny.119
This principle was a “maxim,” a term that seems to incorporate not just the
objective attributes of the action but also the motivation behind it.120  Publicity,
however, was a necessary but insufficient criterion of morality.  Among other
things, an action must be “universal” in the sense that the actor himself is will-
ing to be subjected to its force.121
Some two centuries later, John Rawls attempted to expand upon Kantian
ethics, as well as the idea of the social contract found in the writings of Locke
and Rousseau, to counter the seemingly fatal objections to deontology and the
dominance of utilitarianism.122  Specifically, Rawls developed a model of “pure
procedural justice,” in which substantive outcomes are deemed just, not for
their adherence to a comprehensive moral doctrine, but through a commitment
to fair procedures by citizens who view one another as free and equal.123  Deci-
sion-makers are situated in the hypothetical “original position,” acting as trus-
tees for the interests of other individuals, and then placed behind the “veil of
ignorance,” which precludes knowledge of their principals’ individuating traits,
such as race, sex, and age.124  Rawls’ rhetorical devices produce specific tenets of
justice (for instance, the “equal liberty” and “difference” principles125), but other
aspects of his proceduralism are particularly relevant in the present context.
Like Kant, Rawls recognizes publicity as a condition of justice, roughly, that
116. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (1784),
reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 54 (H. B. Nisbet trans., Hans Reiss ed., 1991).
117. Cf. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE  (George Bull, trans., Penguin Books 1961) (1532).
118. Admittedly, Kantian philosophy is an “experiment in pure reason” and not necessarily a stan-
dard for actual governance.  David Luban, The Publicity Principal, in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra
note 26, at 156.
119. Id. at 155–56.
120. Id. at 168–69.
121. See id. at 180–82; Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 42, at 769, n.16 (arguing that “ideally citi-
zens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported
by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact”
and noting that “[t]here is some resemblance between this criterion and Kant’s principle”).  This is only
one of many potential formulations of Kant’s “categorical imperative.”
122. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE]; Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 42, at 806–07.
123. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 122, at 86; Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note
4, at 580–82; Karol Edward Sołtan, Generic Constitutionalism, in A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 27, at 85–86.
124. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 122, at 11–22, 136–42, 516–17; see also JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 22–28 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
125.  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 124, at 5–6, 291; RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 122, at 60–90, 150–61, 302–03.
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decisions and their supporting rationales should be known or knowable to the
citizenry.126  This visibility of actions and justifications provides the material for
interpersonal discourse on appropriate policy choices, which, in turn, “checks
partiality and widens perspective.”127  When individuals are committed to the
idea of public reason grounded in reciprocity—a willingness to justify one’s
position in terms reasonable to others, both substantively and procedurally—
mutually acceptable resolutions become possible.128  Given that even pluralistic
societies maintain an overlapping consensus on certain conceptions of justice,129
decision-makers can thus reach a “reflective equilibrium” on appropriate judg-
ments through reasoned discourse and deliberation.130
As some have suggested, Jürgen Habermas “substantially perfects and com-
pletes the Kantian project undertaken by John Rawls.”131  In his book, Between
Facts and Norms, Habermas provides an extensive theory of law and democracy
in modern pluralistic societies, arguing that legal commands can no longer look
to tradition or nature for their legitimacy.132  Instead, “the democratic process
bears the entire burden of legitimation” by means of public discussion.
According to Habermas’ “discourse principle,” state action achieves normative
validity when it is the product of rational dialogue by affected parties, each
having an equal opportunity to present arguments and agreeing to be bound by
superior reasons rather than self-interest.133  The parties must also view them-
selves as both the author and addressee of an action, integrating reversibility of
perspectives and a level of empathy in argumentation.134  Eventually, discourse
on government policy—repeated over time and committed to superior public
reasoning—will lead individuals to acceptable resolutions, whether by conflu-
ence of opinion or fair compromise.135
Both Rawls and Habermas support the idea of “deliberative democracy”:
public decision-making by popular participation and disinterested discussion of
the common good.136  They converge on this point, however, from somewhat dis-
126.  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 125, at 66–71; RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 122, at 16, 133, 177–82, 454; Luban, supra note 118, at 180–82.
127. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 122, at 358–59.
128.  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 125, at 7, 10, 212–54.
129. See generally Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 42.
130.  RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 122, at 20.
131. Michel Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap Between Democracy and Rights, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (1995).
132. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 1–3, 8–9, 95, 98–99, 106–07, 113, 443, 448, 457–58 (William Rehg
trans., 1996) [hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS ].
133. Id. at 107–09.
134. Id. at 6–7, 33, 414–15, 417, 449; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 122 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990).
135. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 132, at 108, 155–56, 165–67, 452; Pettit, supra note
28, at 84–85.
136. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 132, chs. 7–8; Rawls, Public Reason, supra note
42, at 771–73.
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tinct paths—liberalism for Rawls137 versus radical democratic theory for Haber-
mas.138  The revival of republicanism provides yet another theoretical avenue
leading to the deliberative conception of democracy.139  Contemporary advo-
cates argue that U.S. constitutional government was founded upon the republi-
can tradition, with freedom and liberty achieved by the practice of citizenship.140
This required both broad participation and subordination of personal interest to
the general welfare, all with the goal of self-governance through the formation
of popular will and its embodiment in state action.141  Among others, Cass Sun-
stein has been particularly active in developing modern “civic republicanism.”142
In an influential article, Sunstein offers four basic principles of republican free-
dom: (1) full deliberation on political decisions, thereby limiting the influence of
self-interest through public scrutiny; (2) equality among citizens, requiring equi-
table access to the political process as a means of overcoming disparities in
power and participation; (3) a commitment to universalism, the idea that con-
troversies often can be resolved through discourse and deliberation; and (4) an
enriched notion of citizenship, understood as comprehensive rights to political
participation.143  Together, these principles stimulate deliberative democracy,
Sunstein argues, encouraging broad involvement of civic-minded, co-equal citi-
zens in the process of government decision-making.
Rawls, Habermas, and Sunstein offer moral theories of right and political
theories of social legitimacy, occasionally overlapping on certain principles
regardless of distinct origins or analytic development.  Their relevant works144
tend to be theoretical in the purest sense of the word: abstract, hypothetical,
ideal.  Yet despite the use of rhetoric rather than experiment, the principles
upon which the scholars converge are nonetheless supported by empirical
research.  In particular, social psychologist Tom Tyler has extensively examined
the relationship among procedural justice, perceived legitimacy, and compli-
137. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 125; Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 42.
138. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 132, at 136, 237, 371, 471–72, 479–80.
139. For seminal articles on the “republican revival” in modern legal scholarship, see, for example,
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984);
Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term: Foreword—Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond]; Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Interest Groups].
140. Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 585; R. Randall Rainey & William Rehg, The
Marketplace of Ideas, the Public Interest, and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: Implications
of Habermas’ Theory of Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1951 (1996).
141. Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 585.
142. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH; Sun-
stein, Beyond, supra note 139; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 139.
143. Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 139, at 1541–42, 1547–58.
144. It should be noted, however, that Professor Sunstein has also contributed to both the social
norms and behavioral law and economics movements.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL
LAW & ECONOMICS (2000); Cass R.  Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 74.
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ance with the law.145  Based on a review of scientific studies and his own experi-
ments, Tyler proposes a two-step process, “with people’s judgments about the
justice or injustice of their experience affecting their views about the legitimacy
of the authorities, and these views in turn shaping compliance with the law.”146
Somewhat surprisingly, substantive outcomes and their effects on personal self-
interest (that is, distributive justice) were less influential than considerations of
fair process on perceived legitimacy and resulting legal compliance.147
Tyler identified specific factors that affected individual assessments of pro-
cedural justice, including a number of values espoused by Kant, Rawls, Haber-
mas, and Sunstein.  Consistent with the publicity principle, people evaluate
authority based on the quantity and quality of information they receive, both in
terms of positive actions and normative justifications.148  In turn, the values of
participation and discourse were highly relevant, with individuals measuring
procedural justice by the extent to which they were allowed to participate in the
process and voice their concerns.149  Finally, people expect that official decisions
will be made in a neutral, unbiased manner based on objective information, a
requirement loosely analogous to the demand for public reason over self-inter-
est.150
145. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY]; Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.
847 (1998); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent With Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on
Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871 (1997) [hereinafter Tyler, Citizen Discontent]; Tom R.
Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The
United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994).
146. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 145, at 6.  Conversely, “[i]f people feel unfairly
treated when they deal with legal authorities, they then view the authorities as less legitimate and as a
consequence obey the law less frequently in their everyday lives.”  Id. at 108.
147. See id. at 97; Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 145, at 739–42.
148. See, e.g., TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 145, at 159 (“Authorities can enhance the
acceptance of their decisions by the way they present them to affected parties.  The justifications that
leaders offer for their actions seem to affect the responses .  .  .  to the actions.”); see also id. at 151, 153.
149. See, e.g., id., supra note 145, at 116–18, 126–34, 137, 147–50, 163; Tyler & Mitchell, supra note
145, at 751; Tyler, Citizen Discontent, supra note 145, at 887–89.
150. See, e.g., TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 145, at 137; Tyler, Citizen Discontent, supra
note 145, at 892; Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 145, at 786–88.
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2. Basic Principles.  Drawing upon the aforementioned philosophical
scholarship and supportive empirical research, it is possible to craft a small set
of principles for transparent policing, a strategy for increasing perceived legiti-
macy by making law enforcement actions and intentions available to affected
citizens and allowing them to participate in the decision-making process.  I have
previously articulated three such principles151 and now add two more as essential
(if not already implicit) corollaries: (1) visibility; (2) justification; (3) voice; (4)
deliberation; and (5) revisability.
a. Visibility.  The first principle, visibility, demands that law enforce-
ment policies and, to the extent possible, their actual implementation on the
streets be available to the relevant community.152  In practice, this means that
programmatic resolutions by police administrators (for example, the decision to
crack down on pandering near “Main Street”) should usually be announced to
the affected citizenry and that the discretionary actions of beat cops (for exam-
ple, the decision to stop or use force against a particular individual) should be
recorded for subsequent review by the public.
b. Justification.  The second principle, justification, is connected to the
first—specifically, it requires an announced rationale for a given police policy or
street-level decision.153  For strategic plans, the justification may take the form of
a criminological theory applied to a particular neighborhood, while dis-
cretionary actions by line officers typically will be based on the mustering of
facts for individualized suspicion.  Either way, the principles of visibility and
justification are consistent with the Kantian publicity criterion and its modern
reformulation by Rawls, as well as necessary prerequisites for informed delib-
eration in the theories of Habermas and Sunstein.154  Needless to say, citizen dis-
course on public decisions seems impossible (or just downright silly) without
general knowledge of state actions and their rationales.
c. Voice, deliberation, and revisability.  The remaining principles con-
cern the process of law enforcement decision-making, with an emphasis on
151. See generally Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4 (setting out principles of visibility, justi-
fication, and voice).
152. For example, according to one government report:
The police department . . . is not an entity unto itself.  Rather, it is a part of government and
exists only for the purpose of serving the public to which it must be accountable.  An impor-
tant element of accountability is openness.  Secrecy in police work is not only undesirable but
unwarranted.  Accountability also means being responsive to the problems and needs of citi-
zens.  Accountability means, in addition, managing police resources in the most cost-effective
manner.  It must be remembered that the power to police comes from the consent of those
being policed.
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING, supra note 41, at 3; see also FULLER, supra note 57, at 39, 43–44, 49–
51 (discussing requirement that government rules be publicly known or knowable).@
153. Elkin, Constitutionalism’s Successor, supra note 40, at 137–38; Luban, supra note 118, at 154–
96; Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 580–89; Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at
1164–65; Pettit, supra note 51, at 130.
154. Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 580–89.
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public involvement and legitimation.  What I have termed “voice” is the ability
of affected individuals and groups to participate in the process of policy formu-
lation and the review of specific actions, allowing their concerns to be aired and
genuinely considered by law enforcement.155  This seems nothing less than an
indispensable element of Habermas’ discourse theory and Sunstein’s concep-
tion of republican freedom, grounded as they are in broad participation and
dialogue.156  The principle of “deliberation,” in turn, is concerned with the sub-
stance of debate and the rationale for action, that the arguments in favor of and
ultimately supporting a police policy fit within the general domain of social wel-
fare.  Reducing residential burglaries in the vicinity seems appropriate, but not
appeasing voters outside of the neighborhood or limiting one’s own chances of
being nabbed for drug dealing.  As such, the goal of deliberation roughly corre-
sponds to public reason and civic-minded argument over pure self-interest.157
The final principle, “revisability,” might simply be assumed from the forego-
ing—that whatever decisions are reached by police-citizen discussion should be
subject to revision.  Nonetheless, it seems important enough to be made
explicit, given the inexorable reality that the judgments of fallible beings can be
well-intentioned and yet terribly flawed in practice.  Revisability requires an
ongoing review of police policies and, if necessary, their revision based on expe-
rience.
III
AN EXAMPLE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
What has been sketched to this point is a two-part framework for institu-
tional design of a more democratic police force, with the first strand concerned
with potential rationales for officer misconduct and methods of limiting such
behavior, and the second strand focused on the predicates of legitimate gov-
ernment and the means of increasing the perceived legitimacy of law enforce-
ment.  As applied to distrustful, antagonistic relations between police and Afri-
can Americans, the goal is to: (1) decrease police misconduct through
behavioral–cognitive modification, thereby increasing the trustworthiness of
law enforcement; and (2) increase the basis for trust and legitimacy by allowing
affected neighborhoods to observe and participate in the process of police deci-
sion-making.  Admittedly, there are limits to what institutional design can do in
this context.  Even the best-designed police department cannot solve the socio-
155. Anderson, supra note 110, at 106–07; Elkin, Constitutionalism’s Successor, supra note 40, at
137–38; Ferejohn, supra note 42, at 97–98; Kim, supra note 58, at 494–95; Luna, Principled
Enforcement, supra note 4, at 580–89; Rainey & Rehg, supra note 140, at 1951–52, 1956–72; Rawls,
Public Reason, supra note 42 at 771–73; Shapiro & Macedo, supra note 111, at 1–2.
156. Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 582–87.
157. Id. at 585–89; Elkin, Constitutionalism’s Successor, supra note 40, at 134; Ferejohn, supra note
42, at 75–79; Shapiro & Macedo, supra note 111, at 2.  Admittedly, public reason-based deliberation
will often lead to policies that serve personal self-interest, such as reducing the odds that one’s home
will be burgled.  The difference is the focus and scope of argumentation, reaching a conclusion that
serves the welfare of the neighborhood in which an individual happens to be a member versus
argument grounded in pure self-interest irrespective of the effects on one’s neighbors.
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economic deprivation of poor, urban minorities.  The framework also makes
some fundamental but questionable assumptions, namely, that a given police
department and affected neighborhood are willing to work together and that
sufficient resources exist to implement any proposals.  Finally, it seems unrealis-
tic to believe that misconduct can be totally eliminated from large police
departments,158 while complete transparency in law enforcement appears just as
infeasible.159  In law enforcement, like life in general, the only absolute is that
there are no absolutes.
But for present purposes, assume the existence of necessary resources and a
basic desire by the relevant police force and African-American community to
improve their relations, as well as a recognition, for example, that law enforce-
ment cannot (directly) improve rotten schools, that some information cannot be
readily turned over to the public, and that misconduct can be (greatly) reduced
but not eliminated in sizeable agencies.  Imagine, for instance, a poor, urban,
largely black neighborhood, caught between the street crime and violence of
private thugs and the harassment and physical abuse of beat cops.  For what-
ever reason, the local police department comes to appreciate the wrongfulness
of not only the former private criminality but also the latter public misconduct.
Now, the currently distrustful neighborhood and the apparently illegitimate law
enforcement agency have both the will and means to build a trustworthy rela-
tionship premised on popular consent and official legitimacy.  Given this hypo-
thetical, the framework of institutional design might suggest a number of the-
matic and programmatic changes:
1. Modernized management.  The management style typified by Frank
Rizzo in Philadelphia and Daryl Gates in Los Angeles160—insular, authoritarian,
158. Robert J. McCormack, Police Perceptions and the Norming of Institutional Corruption, in
POLICE MISCONDUCT, supra note 10, at 106.
159. Nonetheless, reasonable people can understand the need for reasonable exceptions to open
government as long as the exception is strictly justified and limited in scope.
There are, of course, exceptions to full transparency.  Top-secret issues of national security are
not openly debated in Congress.  Law enforcement is frequently mum on the details of ongo-
ing criminal investigations or when an individual’s safety might be jeopardized by disclosure.
Moreover, discussions in judicial chambers are generally not subject to public observation.
Yet purposeful opaqueness in certain, well-defined scenarios is not necessarily inconsistent
with optimal government transparency.  The substance of ongoing investigations are not
divulged to the public, for example, because full disclosure tends to frustrate the very purpose
of the investigation—uncovering criminality, determining guilt, and requiring offenders to
account for their actions.
Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1165; see also FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra
note 57, at 91–92 (“[I]t is always unfortunate when any act of government must be concealed from the
public and thus shielded from public criticism.  But there are times when we must bow to grim neces-
sity.”).
160. See, e.g., BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 241–42 (“Two of the best examples of chiefs’
promoting a subculture of violence was the long reign of Daryl F. Gates as police chief of the Los
Angeles Police Department and Frank Rizzo who was both chief of police and mayor of Philadel-
phia.”); SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 134–45 (discussing insular police leadership of Frank
Rizzo in Philadelphia, Harold Breier in Milwaukee, and Daryl Gates in Los Angeles); Chevigny, supra
note 15, at 37–57 (discussing LAPD under Daryl Gates); Ronald J. Ostrow, Casual Drug Users Should
Be Shot, Gates Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1990, at A1 (quoting Chief Gates as testifying before the
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ruthless—poses an enormous barrier to better police-minority relations.  In
departments that have espoused this approach, positive change must begin at
the top with an emphasis on ethics and integrity over efficiency and force,
flowing down from the chief to rank-and-file officers.161  Police management
may, in fact, adopt an entirely different philosophy akin to those employed in
modern corporations, such as “total quality management” (“TQM”).162  Instead
of concentrating solely on production numbers (for example, arrests),163 a TQM
approach would focus on employees (police officers), clients (citizens), team-
work, and feedback in determining the appropriate ends and means of polic-
ing.164
2. Open systems.  The adoption of TQM or a similar management style is
consistent with an “open systems” approach to law enforcement, with police
leadership actively soliciting input from external sources, most notably, affected
neighborhoods and their members.165  Insular police forces composed of like-
minded individuals will tend to experience “groupthink”—a monolithic per-
spective on law enforcement and the neighborhoods they patrol.166  In contrast,
an open system will seek broad stakeholder participation to facilitate the flow
of intelligence between police and citizenry, thereby creating a “learning
organization” rather than a static bureaucracy.167  Transparent law enforcement
would make a habit of gathering relevant information, such as collecting data
on pedestrian and automobile stops,168 videotaping police-citizen confrontations
and custodial interrogation,169 and employing crime mapping technology to illus-
Senate Judiciary Committee that casual drug users “ought to be taken out and shot” because “we’re in
a war” and even casual drug use is “treason”).
161. See, e.g., BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 102–03; STEPHEN J. GAFFIGAN & PHYLLIS P.
MCDONALD, POLICE INTEGRITY: PUBLIC SERVICE WITH HONOR 47–49, 86–89 (1997); James D.
Sewell, The Police Officer’s Ethical Use of Force, in POLICE MISCONDUCT, supra note 10, at 194–95.
162.  BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 89–93; DAVID C. COUPER & SABINE H. LOBITZ,
QUALITY POLICING: THE MADISON EXPERIENCE (1991) (chronicling the experiences of the Madison
Police Department in implementing a “TQM” approach to policing); RAYMOND G. HUNT & JOHN M.
MAGENAU, POWER AND THE POLICE CHIEF: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
127 (1993); PALMIOTTO, POLICING, supra note 10, at 132–37.
163. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 125 (“To use Herman Goldstein’s term, the police are
locked in a means/ends syndrome, in which they tell us how often they employ the tools they have been
provided to achieve their goals rather than whether the goals themselves have been achieved.” )
164.  BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 92–93; HUNT & MAGENAU, supra note 163, at 127;
PALMIOTTO, supra note 10, at 132–37.
165. BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 85; PALMIOTTO, supra note 10, at 122.
166. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 241.
167. BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 85; NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 184–85;
Lambert & Oatley, supra note 36, at 126–27.
168. See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 99–5970 (MLC), (D.N.J. 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm (consent decree requiring data
collection on race of motorists searched) (last visited Mar. 18, 2003); Fagan & Davies, supra note 5, at
501–03 (arguing for data collection); Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1170; David A.
Harris, When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming Backlash Against Racial Profiling Studies, 6 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 237, 242–43, 261–63 (2001) (presenting arguments in favor of data collection).
169. See, e.g., End Racial Profiling Speech by U.S.  Senator Jon Corzine: Introducing S. 989, the
“End Racial Profiling Act,” 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 55, 60 (2001) (describing federal anti-profiling
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trate and analyze the occurrence of crime and deployment of police resources.170
In turn, departments would provide this information and other important mate-
rials to affected neighborhoods and communities, whether in media distribu-
tions, through public forums, or by answering individual requests.171
3. Collaborative decision-making.  The circulation of information and ideas
also provides the basis for various means of cooperative decision-making by
police and private citizens.  For instance, “community policing” encourages
direct contact and partnership between patrol officers and residents in setting
local priorities and solving neighborhood problems.  Likewise, the concept of a
civilian advisory board suggests that police leaders should obtain the input and
assent of citizen representatives when analyzing law enforcement policies that
significantly affect a neighborhood and its members.172  Along these lines, I have
discussed elsewhere the idea of a collaborative rulemaking process that would
create principles to guide vice enforcement in poor minority neighborhoods.173
Whatever the mechanism, decision-making through police-citizen collaboration
results in a movement from the golden rule—“treat others as you would like to
be treated yourself”—to the so-called platinum rule: “treat others as they want
to be treated.”174
4. Improved recruitment.  The platinum rule might influence recruitment as
well, creating a police force cognizant of the needs and demands of the relevant
neighborhood.  To the extent possible, recruitment efforts should focus on col-
lege-educated individuals, given that a body of scholarship suggests that such
recruits outperform their peers.175  In particular, it has been argued that higher
education teaches weighty concepts like liberty and democracy, imparts prob-
lem-solving techniques and interpersonal skills, and exposes individuals to dif-
ferent cultures and racial backgrounds, all of which decrease the prospect of
bill that helps police departments purchase videotape equipment) [hereinafter Corzine Speech]; Greg-
ory M. Lipper, Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 551, 560 (2001) (noting New Jersey campaign to
install video cameras in all police cars).
170. Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1170–93.
171. According to one government report:
An area of policy that goes hand-in-hand with police accountability and police-community
relations is the law enforcement agency’s approach to release of public information.  It should
be recognized that the news media serve as a major source of information about the police
and their activities.  As such, the media play a key role in developing citizens’ views of the
police.  Given this important media role, it is difficult to understand why so many police agen-
cies fail to develop a public information policy and a relationship with the media based on
mutual respect and trust. . . .  Misinformed community members may . . . form erroneous
perceptions of the police and their actions.  Police officials must provide sufficient information
and detail to accurately explain an incident.
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING, supra note 41, at 12–13.
172. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 3, at 54 (calling for citizen commissions to examine racial dispari-
ties); NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 151–54 (discussing citizen advisory board); Kim, supra
note 58 (proposing civilian advisory councils).
173. Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 603–23.
174. NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 164.
175. McCormack, supra note 158, at 105.
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police misconduct.176  Of course, successful hiring of better educated or skilled
individuals, who are likely to have other job opportunities, will require a higher
pay scale and scholarship opportunities akin to those employed by the armed
forces.177  In addition, law enforcement can greatly benefit from recruiting
African Americans, not only for the broader perspective that diversity brings to
a department, but also for the symbolic value to black neighborhoods that
might otherwise perceive the police as lily-white oppressors in the mold of Jim
Crow.178  Finally, the hiring process should incorporate an extensive battery of
tests for psychological deficiencies, vetting those individuals with strong indicia
of racial prejudice, violent tendencies, or other traits unsuitable for police
work.179
5. Enhanced training.  The importance of officer instruction in checking
misconduct cannot be underestimated,180 both for new recruits at the police
academy and as in-service training for veterans.181  Instruction should include a
heavy emphasis on the use of force and the determination of individualized sus-
picion, issues that heighten minority animosity toward law enforcement.182
Extensive, realistic drills, possibly with high-tech simulators on the use of lethal
force, can help prevent deadly confrontations attributable to inexperience or
176. PALMIOTTO, supra note 10, at 258–62; Michael J. Palmiotto, Can Police Recruiting Control
Police Misconduct?, in POLICE MISCONDUCT, supra note 10, at 350–51; Lipper, supra note 169, at 560.
177. MEEKS, supra note 20, at 171 (noting national crime bill to help police departments hire better
educated officers); SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 261–66 (arguing for the creation of a police
cadet corps and other programs to increase educated personnel); Jacob H. Fries, Disappointed by
Raises, Officers Praise Their Union, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002 (noting low pay for NYPD officers);
Richard Lezin Jones, Study of Police Recruiting Cites Discipline and Academic Faults, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2001 (noting need for salary increase for police).
178.  See, e.g., SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 239–41 (arguing for diversity in police force);
Galvin, supra note 14, at A14 (President Clinton calling for recruitment of more minority officers,
saying “Police departments ought to reflect the diversity of the communities they serve.”); How Would
You Fix the State Police?, STAR–LEDGER (Newark N.J.), Oct. 3, 1999, at 1 (quoting minority police
officer who notes that, “[a]s members of the minority community, we are an indispensable resource to
the rebuilding of trust and confidence” in law enforcement).
179. PALMIOTTO, supra note 10, at 253; NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 172–74; Christo-
pher Commission, supra note 17, at A12; Eugene Kane, Police Are Key, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL,
Feb. 1, 2001, at B1 (noting desire of police commission “to weed out bad cops with psychological test-
ing”).
180.  NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 175–83; PALMIOTTO, POLICING, supra note 10, at
262–71; Sewell, supra note 161, at 191–93; Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Jus-
tice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 826–30 (1999); JUSTICE ON TRIAL:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 53, available at
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/cj/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
181. BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 273–74; NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 218;
Sewell, supra note 161, at 193; End Racial Profiling Speech, supra note 269, at 60 (noting that federal
anti-profiling bill will “help pay for programs dealing with advanced training” of law enforcement).
182.  BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 247 (discussing high-tech training on the use of force);
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING, supra note 41, at 21–25; Jerome H. Skolnick & Abigail Caplovitz,
Guns, Drugs, and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns and Minimize Racial Profiling, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 417,
433–35, 436 (2001) (noting improved police behavior through training on individualized suspicion).
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rash responses.183  The latter problem—identifying potential criminals—will
require more than a mini-course on criminal procedure doctrine.  Police must
also be trained on standards of professional integrity and ethics, and compelled
to examine the moral justification and consequences of their actions.184  More-
over, officers should be instructed on the complexities of culture, ethnicity, and
race, particularly as they pertain to the neighborhoods they police.185  Recent
recruits and department veterans alike should come to understand the history
of racial subjugation, much of it at the hands of police, as well as the ongoing
meaning of law enforcement in minority communities.  Police officers should be
forced to confront their own biases—such as the assumption of black criminal-
ity186—while learning the cues that are transmitted during police–citizen con-
frontations.  Furthermore, law enforcement agents should be taught to appreci-
ate and practice the value of civility, given the substantial benefits from being
respectful and courteous in otherwise contentious circumstances.187
183.  PALMIOTTO, supra note 10, at 212–14; Rebecca Leung, The Fine Blue Line: Putting Police
Training Programs to the Test, ABCNEWS.com, available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/
DailyNews/police_training990405.html (last visited March 26, 2003).
184.  BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 273–74 (training on police ethics); NEYROUD &
BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 181–83; MEEKS, supra note 20, at 171 (noting national crime bill to help
police departments expand police integrity and ethics training); Sewell, supra note 161, at 191–92.  See
generally, JOHN P. CRANK & MICHAEL A. CALDERO, POLICE ETHICS: THE CORRUPTION OF NOBLE
CAUSE (2000); EDWIN J. DELATTRE, CHARACTER AND COPS: ETHICS IN POLICING (3d ed. 1996);
DEBBIE J.  GOODMAN, ENFORCING ETHICS: A SCENARIO-BASED WORKBOOK FOR POLICE AND
CORRECTIONS RECRUITS AND OFFICERS (1998); LARRY F. JETMORE, THE PATH OF THE WARRIOR:
AN ETHICAL GUIDE TO PERSONAL & PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIELD OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999); JOHN R. JONES & DANIEL P. CARLSON, REPUTABLE CONDUCT: ETHICAL
ISSUES IN POLICING AND CORRECTIONS (2d ed. 2001).
185. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN AMERICAN
COMMUNITIES: POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND DISCRIMINATION—VOLUME V: THE LOS ANGELES
REPORT (1999) (report recommending more cultural sensitivity training for police officers); Christo-
pher Commission, supra note 17, at A12; Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and
the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 1008–12 (1999); Al Martinez, The Thin Blue Line, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000 at A1 (describing training program for police offered by the Simon Wiesenthal
Museum of Tolerance).
186. For instance, the executive director of the ACLU, Ira Glasser, offered an evocative analogy
undermining the assumption of black criminality:
Most players in the NBA are black.  But if you were trying to get a team together, you
wouldn’t go out in the street and round up random African Americans.  Most jazz musicians
are black.  But if you went to hire a band, you wouldn’t go out in the street and round up
random blacks and ask them if they played the saxophone.  It wouldn’t be a good way to find
what you wanted.  It’s a very simple, logical fallacy.  The fact that most drug dealers are X
does not mean that most X are drug dealers.
Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 712–13 (2000).
187. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2169–76 (2002)
(noting advantages from respectful police behavior); Leung, supra note 183 (discussing police training
on courtesy); Benjamin Y. Lowe, FBI Agent Says Charges of Racial Profiling of Arabs, Muslims are
Legitimate, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. SERVICE, Sept. 6, 2002 (discussing cultural awareness seminar for
law enforcement and quoting federal agent as saying, “Being respectful and courteous goes a long way
toward building a relationship” and quoting spokeswoman for Council on American–Islamic Relations
as saying, “People are a lot more willing to help when they feel the people investigating them are not
biased and have at least some understanding of the community”).
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6. Performance standards and culture.  Certain quantitative measures of
police performance only tend to exacerbate the perception of harassment
among African Americans.  Instead of evaluating law enforcement, both indi-
vidually and collectively, by traditional standards such as arrests and seizures,
“police performance measures should focus on a new model of policing that
emphasizes [law enforcement’s] charge to do justice, promote secure communi-
ties, restore crime victims, and promote noncriminal options.”188  Although more
difficult to collect, qualitative criteria—such as citizen complaints or, con-
versely, commendations by neighborhood residents—often provide a better pic-
ture of officer performance consistent with the platinum rule.189  Moreover, law
enforcement should promulgate rules and standards intended to guide individ-
ual behavior on the beat, including flat bans on particular conduct such as racial
profiling,190 regulations on common police activities like car stops,191 and codes of
ethics that provide overarching principles of good policing.192  Improved
behavior and reduced misconduct also may be achieved by interfering with anti-
social police cultures.  For example, breaking up troublesome units or rotating
officers within specialized groups may prevent the formation of deviant
cliques.193
188. Geoffrey P. Alpert & Mark H. Moore, Measuring Police Performance in the New Paradigm of
Policing, in PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 109, 111 (1993), quoted
in BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 346.  See Joseph D. McNamara, Beyond Good Cop, Bad
Cop, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at M2 (“Voluminous arrests . . . are not ends in themselves.  They are
only tools a police department needs to serve the community.”); Lori Montgomery, New Police Policies
Aim to Discourage Racial Profiling, WASH. POST, June 28, 2001, at A1 (noting cancellation of police
award system based on drug arrests).
189. See NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 217; Alpert & Moore, supra note 188.
190. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 180, 188–89 (detailing success of NYPD Police Commis-
sioner Patrick Murphy’s flat rule against policing for victimless crimes without a citizen complaint);
David Cole, Pervasive Racial Profiling is Abundantly Evident and a Barrier to Equal Justice, INSIGHT
ON THE NEWS, July 19, 1999, at 24 (“[G]overnment officials must make absolutely clear that racial pro-
filing is unacceptable.  Some police chiefs have said so, but others have tolerated the practice through
their silence.  As long as the practice is not clearly condemned, police will continue to do it because
they are affected by the same stereotypes that affect us all.”); Hernan Rozemberg, Racial-Profile Policy
Goal of Napolitano, ARIZ. REPUB., Nov. 13, 2000, at B1, B7 (state attorney general and police chiefs
banning racial profiling).
191. MEEKS, supra note 20, at 213–17 (describing specific procedures for car stops by New Jersey
State Police); Adero S. Jernigan, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 127, 137 (2000) (calling on police departments to develop regulations limiting officer
discretion during traffic stops); KLEINIG, supra note 40, at 222–23 (advocating administrative rule-
making by police); Rozemberg, supra note 190, at B1 (detailing attorney general’s request that every
police department have a policy and procedures for traffic stops).
192.  BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 273; KLEINIG, supra note 40, at 234–55 (discussing
police codes of ethics); NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 23–27, 189–98, 218; SKOLNICK &
FYFE, supra note 14, at 241–50; PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING, supra note 41, at 2–4; David Cole,
Race, Policing, and the Future of the Criminal Law, 26 HUMAN RIGHTS 2, 4 (Summer 1999) (calling on
police leadership to ban racial profiling).
193. Dotson, supra note 18, at M1 (advocating breaking up rogue police units and rotating officers);
Jim Newton et. al, LAPD Condemned by Its Own Inquiry, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at A1 (noting rec-
ommendation “calling for mandatory rotations in certain sensitive units” in LAPD); Christopher
Commission, supra note 17, at A12.
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7. Empathy creation.  A sense of empathy can be the cornerstone of better
relations between law enforcement and minority citizens.  Requiring officers to
live in the areas they patrol, for instance, may increase the level of respect and
compassion for neighborhood residents.194  Another idea involves radical feder-
alism or localism, placing control of law enforcement in the affected neighbor-
hood regardless of political boundaries.195  Officer misconduct, or at least the
failure to remedy it, stems in part from police departments that are practically
accountable only to the larger polity rather than the neighborhoods that directly
suffer the abuses.  By making police jurisdiction and political accountability
coextensive with the rough boundaries of minority neighborhoods, law
enforcement must answer to those touched by misconduct.  In turn, public
empathy for the difficulties of police work can be fostered by “citizen police
academies” that teach local residents about the operations of law enforcement,
such as dispatching police units, making traffic stops, and investigating crime
scenes.196  These academies also would generate sources of volunteers or “para-
police” employees—individuals who take on various law enforcement-related
tasks—thereby releasing officers to perform their core duties while establishing
another connection between police and minority communities.197  A final prom-
ising means of creating empathy is through the mediation of grievances between
officers and citizens.198  Drawing upon the extensive literature on alternative
dispute resolution and the growing field of restorative justice, a number of
mediation programs are “designed to resolve citizen complaints against the
police through face-to-face meetings between the complainant and the police
194. See, e.g., MEEKS, supra note 20, at 203 (“A solution to this particular problem is to require that
inner-city police officers live in inner-city neighborhoods.  Otherwise, . . . the continued practice of
inner-city police officers living in white suburban communities makes them seem like a U.S. military
force occupying a foreign country.”).
195.  NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14, at 151–54, 217; Grofman & Stockwell, supra note 42;
Kim, supra note 58, at 462–63, 509–25 (calling for local or community control of policing); Luna, Princi-
pled Enforcement, supra note 4, at 587–89 (discussing Sunstein’s idea of “deliberative enclaves”).
[T]he data show that police forces that win the respect of high-crime communities reduce
crime at least as much as those that simply bust heads.  Look at San Diego.  During the 1990s
San Diego police divided the city into small residential units.  (According a local captain, “We
basically threw out the original beat boundaries.  We went to the community and said, ‘Where
do you think your neighborhood boundaries really begin and end?’”)  They assigned officers
to those specific beats, engaged community leaders in an ongoing dialogue about how to solve
various problems, and developed a corps of 1,200 citizen volunteers who became eyes and ears
for the police.
Forman, supra note 18, at 24.
196. MEEKS, supra note 20, at 171 (noting national crime bill to help establish citizen police acade-
mies); PALMIOTTO, supra note 10, at 375–76; Galvin, supra note 14, at A14 (noting President Clinton’s
call for a nationwide program of citizen police academies); Leung, supra note 183 (describing citizen
police academy).
197. PALMIOTTO, supra note 10, at 375–76.  See also SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 261–66
(discussing creation of police cadet corps).
198. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Civilians Versus Police: Mediation Can Help to Bridge the Divide,
NEGOTIATION J. 211 (July 2000); Samuel Walker & Carol Archbold, Mediating Citizen Complaints
Against the Police: An Exploratory Study, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 231 (2000).
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officer with a neutral third party serving as mediator or facilitator.”199  Although
far from a panacea, these programs help clarify actions and justifications in
individual cases, allow both sides to express their concerns and emotions, and
tend to generate mutual understanding between the officer and citizen.200
8. Improved oversight and discipline.  As suggested earlier, law enforce-
ment can control and limit police deviance, but complete elimination may be
impossible.201  What is needed, then, is a proactive system to detect misconduct
and hold the relevant officers responsible.  Departments should implement
early warning systems to alert supervisors of potential trouble, including, for
instance, periodic psychological testing of all officers202 and constant review of
policing statistics, looking for individual and group trends that might indicate
misconduct.203  Law enforcement must also protect the sources of information
on police deviance, encouraging officers to reveal misconduct by their col-
leagues—possibly through a financial or promotion-based incentive scheme—as
well as preventing retaliation against whistleblowers by shielding identities,
offering departmental transfers, and establishing other prophylactics.204  The so-
called “code of silence”205 among police officers can be partially perforated by
making supervisors directly responsible for the wrongdoing under their watch
199. Walker & Archbold, supra note 198, at 234.
200. Berger, supra note 198, at 218–19, 231–32; Walker & Archbold, supra note 198, at 238–41.
201. This does not mean, however, that police departments should not strive to eradicate misbe-
havior as a normative goal.  Whether practical or not, “zero tolerance” policies can have important
symbolic value.
202. BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 245–46; Kane, supra note 179, at B1 (noting desire of
police commission “to weed out bad cops with psychological testing”); Christopher Commission, supra
note 17, at A12.
203. See, e.g., BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 98–99, 245–46; End Racial Profiling Speech,
supra note 169, at 68–69 (describing federal anti-profiling bill that would fund “[d]evelopment and
acquisition of early warning systems and other feedback systems that help identify officers or units of
officers engaged in or at risk of racial profiling or other misconduct, including the technology to support
such systems”); Livingston, Police Reform, supra note 181, at 836–41 (discussing early warning
systems); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops
and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 360–61, 365 (2001) (discussing early warning
systems); Sewell, supra note 161, at 193–94; Skolnick & Caplovitz, supra note 183, at 431–32 (arguing
for data collection and analysis to ascertain problem officers).
204.  MEEKS, supra note 20, at 209 (citing Senator Charles Schumer as supporting whistleblower’s
protection policy); Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 2 Officials Urge Stronger Civilian Control of LAPD, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at A1 (noting proposal to give officers departmental amnesty for reporting mis-
conduct); Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Secrecy Offered to Informers in Rampart Probe, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2000, at A1 (discussing L.A. District Attorney’s offer of confidentiality to police officers who wit-
nessed misconduct); McNamara, supra note 189, at M2 (“If officers police themselves, all the right
objectives can be achieved.  Toward that end, department management must encourage and protect
cops with the courage to stop and report wrongdoing by their colleagues.”); Ana Mendieta, Jackson
Praises Officers for Filing Suit, CHI. SUN–TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at 3 (discussing police officers who came
forward with allegations of racial profiling).
205. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The Blue Wall of Silence as Evidence of Bias and
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 237 (1998) (describing the
“blue wall of silence” as “an unwritten code in many departments which prohibits disclosing perjury or
other misconduct by fellow officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct
of a fellow officer”); Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 4, at 1114 n.14 (citing the “code” or “blue
wall” of silence).
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even if they were unaware of the behavior, thus creating a strong incentive for
police leadership to turn in deviant cops and actively oversee and review the
actions of subordinates. 206 Likewise, law enforcement should reevaluate and, if
necessary, improve the citizen complaint process.207  Potential intimidation
might be diminished by placing the site for filing grievances outside of the
police department, for example, or having nonuniformed employees take and
investigate the complaints.  Citizens should also be made aware of the timing,
progression, and ultimate resolution of their grievances.  Once a claim has been
made, a democratically constituted, wholly autonomous, and fully resourced
citizen review board should instigate a probe through independent investigators
and a properly conferred power of subpoena.  In the end, the board should be
able to reach factual conclusions and appropriate discipline short of criminal
punishment, including the termination of culpable officers.  When the police
misconduct constitutes a crime, however, the offending agents should be prose-
cuted; to do otherwise is to create a double standard for law enforcement that
only increases citizen distrust and animosity.208  Moreover, effective and trust-
worthy prosecution may require an independent state attorney staffed with her
own investigative forces.209  But however an officer is punished, by prosecution
and/or departmental discipline, his name and misdeed should circulate
throughout the agency and be made available to the public.210
* * *
Collectively, these suggested changes attempt to utilize institutional design
and the theories of behavioral and transparent policing to improve the relation-
206. See, e.g., BARTOLLAS & HAHN, supra note 14, at 98–99; NEYROUD & BECKLEY, supra note 14,
at 158; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 192 (advocating punishing supervisors for misconduct by
subordinate officers); Rudovsky, supra note 204, at 296, 365; End Racial Profiling Speech, supra note
169, at 60 (noting that federal anti-profiling bill would “help to establish management systems to ensure
that supervisors are held accountable for the conduct of subordinates”).
207. Consent Decree, supra note 168, (requiring 24-hour, toll-free telephone number for citizen
complaints about police); Livingston, supra note 181, at 830–36; Corzine Speech, supra note 169, at 59–
60 (noting that federal anti-profiling bill would “put in place procedures to receive and investigate
complaints alleging racial profiling”); Sniffen, supra note 23, at A1 (noting Attorney  General  Reno’s
call for police departments to create a complaint system that eliminates citizen fear); Rozemberg,
supra note 190, at B1, B5 (quoting Tucson police chief that some citizens did not know they could file
complaints); cf. ROBERT DAVIS & PEDRO MATEU-GELABERT, RESPECTFUL AND EFFECTIVE
POLICING: TWO EXAMPLES FROM THE SOUTH BRONX (Mar. 1999), at http://vera.org/
publication_pdf/respectful_policing.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003) (discussing successes of police
precincts that made reducing civilian complaints a priority).
208.  CHEVIGNY, supra note 15, at 98–101; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 14, at 195–98; Francis X.
Clines, Officer Charged in Killing That Roiled Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001, at A16.
209.  Panel Urges Remedies to Abuses by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2000, at A18 (describing U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights calls for the creation of a special prosecutor to investigate claims of police
misconduct).
210.  MEEKS, supra note 20, at 208–09; Lisa Fingeret, Activists Urge Greater Police Accountability,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2000, at 1 (quoting black community activist as saying: “Why should we continue to
allow white racist officers to come into our community and beat our [people] and not know who they
are?  We have to identify who they are.”); McCormack, supra note 158, at 106–07; Blame Extends Past
LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at M4 (arguing for broader dissemination of information about
police misconduct).
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ship between law enforcement and African Americans, with the goal of a more
trustworthy, legitimate, and democratic police force.  Consistent with the law-
and-economics/public-choice approach, the incentive structure for law enforce-
ment in the hypothetical department has been modified, starting with qualita-
tive performance criteria that downplay arrests and seizures—thereby
minimizing reward-driven police abuses—and focusing instead on citizen satis-
faction and standards of ethical behavior.  Moreover, both variables in the
deterrence equation have been altered.  The cost of misconduct has been
increased, demanding discipline or termination for wrongdoing and possibly
criminal prosecution of deviant cops.  In turn, the chance of detection has been
heightened through constant review of policing data, a more citizen-friendly
complaint system, and the creation of personal incentives for supervisors and
whistleblowers to expose misconduct.
Using the insight of behavioral law and economics, the conversion to a
neighborhood-oriented, open-system management style attempts to overcome
institutional blind-spots that hinder good police–citizen relations.  Collaborative
decision-making mechanisms, such as civilian policy or review boards, incorpo-
rate external viewpoints that help check problematic biases and heuristics of
police leadership.  Likewise, the hiring and promotion of minority officers
brings an important perspective to an otherwise uniform police force, thereby
challenging racial and cultural assumptions.  An improved recruiting operation
also tries to cull individuals with serious cognitive deficiencies that might lead
to, for instance, race-based policing or unnecessary violence, while an early
warning system hopes to reveal potential indicators of abusive behavior by cur-
rent agents.  The training process then drills appropriate responses to repeat
scenarios, reducing dependence on erroneous mental shortcuts, and formulates
rules and standards that are intended to guide law enforcement in general,
again limiting the reliance on faulty heuristics.  Moreover, an enhanced instruc-
tion program challenges individuals to reexamine their belief systems, educating
officers on the historical use of law enforcement to oppress minorities and the
empirical fallacies of race-based presumptions.211
The described changes recognize the importance of social norms analysis as
well.  By cracking down on even low-level police abuses and publicizing the
same, law enforcement undermines the culture of misconduct and raises the
level of socially influenced deterrence.  In fact, police chiefs can serve as “norm
entrepreneurs,”212 denouncing officer wrongdoing, signaling law enforcement’s
swift and severe response to such behavior, and possibly creating a “cascade
211. For instance, training might include the reading and discussion of Professor Randall Kennedy’s
Race, Crime, and the Law, particularly its excellent treatment of the history of racial prejudice by law
enforcement.  KENNEDY, supra note 1; see also Dinitia Smith, Scottsboro 70 Years Later, Still Notori-
ous, Still Painful, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at E1 (describing wrongful conviction of the “Scottsboro
boys”).
212. Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 74, at 929–30.
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effect,”213 with the norm against police misconduct flowing throughout the
department.  A deviant police culture can also be abated by breaking up units
with a history of abuse and rotating assignments to prevent the formation of
rogue cliques.  Conversely, increasing the presence of black officers and
requiring cops to live in the neighborhoods they police can help improve the
cultural milieu, inculcating an appreciation of minority perspectives and a gen-
eral interest in community well-being.
Finally, the values of transparent policing theory are integrated into the
institutional (re)design of this hypothetical police department.  An open-system
management style is premised on the visibility of its actions, allowing external
voices to be heard and revising policies based on experience.  For instance, col-
lecting data on traffic and pedestrian stops, videotaping police–citizen interac-
tions, and releasing information on officer misconduct all enhance the visibility
of law enforcement to concerned individuals and groups.  Radical localism tries
to realize the platinum rule and democratic consent, ensuring that actions
affecting a given neighborhood are approved by its members.  Other techniques
of empathy creation—such as citizen police academies and complaint mediation
programs—widen viewpoints and improve civic-minded deliberation.  In addi-
tion, collaborative decision-making methods like community policing and civil-
ian policy boards provide an opportunity for citizens to air their concerns and
ideas, for an appropriate resolution to be reached through deliberation, and for
the decision to be subject to ongoing review.
IV
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, many details need to be worked out in applying the framework
of institutional design, as the above example is crafted at a relatively high level
of generality.  Moreover, the propriety and applicability of principles culled
from abstract theory are always debatable.  Kant’s philosophy, after all, is an
“experiment in pure reason”214 rather than a set of precepts for real-life imple-
mentation—and the same can be said for Rawl’s theory of pure procedural jus-
tice.  In turn, Habermas’ writing is dense215 and somewhat utopian, although his
discourse theory at least incorporates some practical considerations.  But as far
as possible prescriptions go, there are clear advantages to a less aggressive, non-
racist, conscientious police force, acting with the consent of the affected citi-
zenry and pursuant to an open, deliberative decision-making process.  With
213. See note 75, supra; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Selective Fatalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 799, 805
(1998); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 74, at 909.
214. See supra note 118.
215. See, e.g., Mitchell Aboulafia, Law Professors Read Habermas, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 943, 943
(1999) (“The law professors having little familiarity with Habermas and his progenitors often found his
work needlessly obtuse and riddled with unfamiliar intellectual byways.  The theoreticians present
found themselves taxed by having to explain and defend the importance of various ruminations that
appear important only to distinction-obsessed philosophical types.”).  For a satirical take on Habermas’
incomprehensibility, see Daniel W. Skubik, Book Review, 44 FED. LAW. 59, 59–61 (Feb. 1997).
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institutional design providing the framework, I am hopeful that the specifics can
be worked out in the context of a particular police department and minority
neighborhood.  The framework might even have implications beyond law
enforcement, such as the institutional (re)design of prosecutor’s offices, correc-
tions agencies, and courtroom practices like bail setting and sentencing.  As this
Symposium has made clear, racial disparities exist throughout the criminal
process, which, in turn, are amenable to empirical analysis.  The framework
would simply incorporate the affinity for data collection into a broader program
of transparency and behavioral modification for the relevant institution.
It must be conceded, however, that the premises underlying the hypothetical
police department and black neighborhood will not hold in many cases.
Assuming the necessary resources to carry out a full-scale program of institu-
tional design is a rather large assumption, and one that will prove false in many
areas.  And regardless of obvious benefits from cooperation, some departments
and communities will continue to point fingers and cast aspersions at one
another.  The Rizzo–Gates style of insularity and recalcitrance to change all but
forecloses the possibility of implementing institutional design and instead calls
for sometimes futile, always uphill actions: legislative proposals, civil rights law-
suits, public protests, federal intervention, and so on.  Even if these adversarial
approaches produce only minor changes within an obstinate police department,
there may be no other options for black neighborhoods and their representa-
tives.  Like the historical experience of non-violent advocacy for civil rights,
both in the United States and elsewhere, sometimes change must occur by pain-
fully small steps over long periods of time.
But however achieved, there is a need to reexamine the institution of law
enforcement and its relationship with communities of color.  The problem is not
racial profiling, or police perjury, or lethal force, but rather all of these issues at
once and, in particular, the institutional sources of officer misconduct.  Severed
from the underlying concern of dysfunctional police–minority relations, band-
aid solutions for particular manifestations of misconduct can dissipate over time
or become equally meaningless as other problems emerge.  Real, large-scale
reform must begin and end with the institution of law enforcement and its rela-
tionship with the people it serves.
